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That the character of Soviet American relations
,
Sino-Soviet relations, and China's relations with the
West have been altered drastically because of the Sino-
Soviet split is undeniable. That the Sino-Soviet split
has made possible the achievement of certain foreign
policy objectives which would have been almost impossi-
ble to attain had the split not existed and that the
Sino-Soviet split has caused certain losses for the
countries involved also appears to be true.
This thesis will discuss the resultant gains
and losses to the United States , to the Union of Soviet




Presently a new order seems to be emerging in
Asia which would modify the old two-sides balance-of-
power. The key to the emergence of this new order
appears to be the Sino-Soviet split which can be inter-
preted as a foundation for the establishment of a new
international order or balance of power--a multi-polar
system vice the bi-polar system which has been evident
during the past twenty years. Whether the new balance-
of-power system will be primarily concerned with a
tri-polar relationship—the United States , the Union of
Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic of
China —or a pentagonal system, which would include
Japan and Western Europe, is a question which will be
answered in the future. However, the Sino-Soviet split
and the ramifications of accompanied Sino-American and
Soviet-American relationships could set the stage for
future world organization.
The Sino-Soviet split has resulted in gains and
advantages for both China and the USSR in the
To avoid monotony and wordiness, China will
refer below to the People's Republic of China (PRO
unless otherwise specified.

realization of several of their foreign policy goals
and has likewise provided the United States with gains
and opportunities for realizing some of her foreign
policy objectives. However, the split has also
weakened relationships between and created losses for
the two most powerful Communist countries— two countries
which could command vast power and influence if united
in a friendly and solid alliance. The split, the
resulting Soviet-American detente, and normalization of
Sino-American relations have also created losses for
the United States in the domestic and international
areas.
An evaluation of the extent of the losses of
the United States, the PRC, and the USSR may assist in
the formulation of predictions of future responses of
the countries concerned. If the losses are too great,
it seems obvious that the countries involved will in
some manner change their policies , thereby modifying to
an unknown extent the new balance-of-power system which
seems to be emerging.

PART I




BACKGROUND OF THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT
In order to recognize the importance of the
Sino-Soviet split and the possibilities it presents for
the U.S. , the USSR, and China, one must understand some
of the factors leading to the split as well as some of
the more pertinent goals and policies of the major
national factors. The following discussion of these
factors is general and intended to be a broad background
leading to focalization on present problems.
The United States and the Soviet Union emerged
from the wreckage of World War II considerably more
powerful in economic and technological resources than
other nations. They were clearly at the top of the
international hierarchy, though with different kinds of
resources—geographic , ideological, administrative,
economic, military, and industrial— at their disposal.
The United States and the Soviet Union became involved
in an ideology conflict which led to the cold war and
the division of the international world order into
basically a bi-polar balance-of-power system. The
Communist Bloc and ideology of world communism was seen

by the United States and her allies as their greatest
threat and they followed a rigid policy of communist
containment
.
Bipolarity, though apparently ratified by the
Test Ban Treaty and the Hot Line, and sanctified by the
writings of such eminent systems theorists as Morton
Kaplan, carried within itself the seeds of its own
demise. As the strategic relationship between the USSR
and the United States became stabilized with the
development of effective second-strike strategies, the
conceivability of strategic war became less likely, the
natural pressures for autonomy among the less powerful
states began to reassert themselves, and power in all
its aspects began to become more diffused. This
occurred, not through a continuous process of nuclear
proliferation, as it was thought it might ten years
ago, but through more diverse forms of diffusion of
initiative and autonomy.
At the end of World War II , China was in the
grips of domestic problems and civil war while the
United States backed the Chinese Nationalist Forces and
the Soviets , rather than supporting the Chinese
1Alastair Buchan , "The End of Bipolarity,"
Adelphi Papers 91 (November 1972): 22.

Communists, recommended that their Chinese comrades
should seek a modus vivendi with Chiang Kai-shek, and
that they whould join the Chiang Kai-shek government
2
and dissolve their army.
It is important to note that China had tradi-
tionally viewed Tzarist Russia as the most pressing
threat to her national security, as the most reactionary
of any of the Western European countries, and the one
country which was least susceptible to any appeal for
3
moderation. However, with the introduction of the
translated literature of Bolshevik Russia into China,
Russia came to be recognized as one who was ready to
treat China as an equal and provide assistance which
would enable her to become truly independent. In 1949,
the communists gained control of mainland China and
formally entered into an alliance with the Soviets.
This was the first deliberately chosen alliance in
China's history. However, the value of the alliance
was soon to be tested with the outbreak of the Korean
War. As a result of the conditional Soviet support and
David Floyd, Mao Against Kh.vusah.ev (New York:
Praeger, 1963), p. 211.
3 David S. Nivison, "Communist Ethics and Chinese
Tradition," in China' s Cultural Legacy and Communism
,
ed. Ralph C. Crozier (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 88.

her lack of actual participation, China began to realize
that independent action on the international stage was
most important because, at that time, her concern was
not Korea but Taiwan. The Chinese Communists delib-
erately presented their revolution as only partially
complete until Taiwan was under their control. All
indications are that, at that time, China was inter-
ested in nothing other than the liberation of Taiwan.
The following quotes reinforce that position.
Chou En-lai (1950)
:
Now, in the name of the Central Peoples' Government
of the People's Republic of China I declare:
Despite any military steps of obstruction taken by
the United States Government, the Chinese people
are irrevocably determined to liberate Taiwan
without fail. 4
Chou En-lai (1951)
The Chinese people . . . will never give up their
sacred duty of liberating Taiwan.
^
General Chu Te (19 52):
Except Taiwan, all Chinese Territory has been
liberated and our national defense is more and more
consolidated.
6
4James Bond Stockdale, "Taiwan and the Smo-
Soviet Dispute" (M.A. thesis, Stanford University),
pp. 6 9-7 0.
5 Ibid.
, p. 29.
6 Ibid., p. 30.

General Chu Te (1953):
The present situation is that although the Korean
War has ceased, American imperialism is still in
occupation of our territory, Taiwan.
The issue was undoubtedly an excellent source
of patriotic stimulation when it was felt necessary to
divert attention from internal problems . The chant
continued, almost without regard for the world political
situation or the "ebb and flow" of the mainland economy.
It is therefore difficult to see why China allowed her-
self to become involved in Korea, unless she was almost
forced into that position by the Soviet Union. There
is much evidence to support that interpretation.
The Korean Communist organization, closely
supervised by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
has existed since the 19 20s. Hundreds of Korean
Communists had served in the Soviet Army. Others had
served with the Soviet intelligence agencies and the
NKVD. After World War II, many of these Koreans
returned to their country with dual Soviet-Korean
citizenship; they maintained close ties with Moscow
during the initial "liberation" of North Korea. Many
of the senior North Korean Army officers had had exten-
sive experience on active duty with the Soviet Army.
7 Ibid.

The Commander in Chief, General Kim Il-sung had served
in the USSR. 8 Chief of Staff and Chief of the Security
Agency, General Nam II was a Soviet citizen who had
fought the Germans at Stalingrad as Chief of Staff of a
. . . . 9Soviet division, and had helped liberate Warsaw.
In 1949 , Korean soldiers were trained and
equipped in Siberia. Aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons,
and naval mines were supplied by the Soviets at that
time. 10 On March 17, 19 49, a Soviet-Korean trade,
technical assistance, and credit agreement was signed.
Some sectors of the North Korean economy (notably oil
and shipping) came under direct Soviet control through
joint-stock companies. In short, in the summer of
19 50, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North
Korea) gave every appearance of being a full-fledged
12
Soviet satellite.
David J. Dallin , Soviet Foreign Policy After
Stalin (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1961), p. 61.
9 .Pawel Monat , "Russians m Korea: The Hidden
Bosses," Life Magazine , 27 June 1960, p. 100.
10 Dallin, p. 62.
Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New







History shows that the relationship between the
Chinese and the North Korean Communists was less amica-
ble. Immediately after World War II, the North Korean




pro-Chinese cadres. In early 1950,
twelve thousand North Korean troops returned home from
China. It has been reported that this was part of the
settlement of a Korean-Chinese dispute concerning
Soviet-sponsored dam construction on the Yalu River in
1948-49, and was brought about by Soviet good offices.
China had asked that these troops be returned as part
of an early phase of their demobilization program in
response to economic pressures on the mainland.
Although the Peking and Pyongyang governments exchanged
diplomatic recognition on December 25, 1949, the
Chinese ambassador didn't arrive at the North Korean
capital until August 13, 1950. He stayed a few months
and then returned to Peking , leaving a charge
d'affaires. Not until 19 5 5 did an ambassador return.
It is almost impossible to construct a case for the
idea of North Korea being a Chinese satellite in the
summer of 1950. 15
13 Ibid., p. 43.
14
Ibid. 15 Dallin, p. 77.

11
The best informed observers at the time of the
attack on South Korea were unanimous in placing the
blame on the USSR and the USSR alone. In July 19 50,
Secretary of State Acheson spoke of the 38th parallel
being part of the iron curtain, and "behind that curtain
the Soviet Union established a Communist regime." On
October 24, 1952, in the United Nations General Assem-
bly, Secretary Acheson charged the Soviet Union with
17being the Instigator of the trouble in Korea. Also
in the United Nations, United States Ambassador Warren
Austin stated his conviction that the influence of the
Chinese compared to the Soviets in starting the Korean
1 8War was "one to ninety-nine." John Foster Dulles,
while a consultant to the Secretary of State, made
frequent references to Soviet instigation of the war.
In July 19 50, he said, "The Communists of North Korea
have struck hard with Soviet tanks, Soviet planes, and
19Soviet heavy artillery."











Claude A. Buss, The Far East (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1955), p. 659.




Editorial opinion in Yugoslavia in the fall of
1950 not only blamed the USSR for the attack, but felt
that one of its main purposes was to establish hegemony
over China in the Far East.
If the Soviet Government wished to assert itself as
the big Asiatic power and to make itself the arbiter
in the solution of Asiatic problems , then North
Korea was a stronghold in Asia on which Moscow could
count one hundred percent in such an action. . . .
that would be a step along the road of letting China
know that there were [not] "two centers," and that
China should join the camp headed by Moscow. 20
Until about the first of August, 1950, the
Chinese Communists were apparently still thinking in
terms of an assault on Taiwan. PRC newspapers stressed
this point continually. The Korean issue was in the
background. In early July, Ambassador Paniffar called
on Mao Tse-tung and after their conversation later
reported to his government in New Delhi that the Chinese
leader was treating Korea as a "distant matter," and was
21 ...
concentrating on Taiwan's future. An editorial in the
Peking People's Daily on July 21st said that by ". . .
actively preparing for the liberation of Taiwan, we
20
M. S. Handler, "Peiping Held Vying for Top
Asian Role," New York Times
,
27 December 1950, p. 1.
21Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1956), p. 117.
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It seems then that through at least August of
1950 the PRC was looking at Korea as a distant problem
and keeping her main focus on Taiwan. However, an
abrupt reversal occurred, the timing of which roughly
coincided with a high level Sino-Soviet conference.
Four Far Eastern radio news sources (Karachi, Taipei,
Hong Kong, and Tokyo) reported the arrival of Vice
Premier Molotov in Peking:
Russian Kuzme Derevyanko , chief of the Soviet
mission in Tokyo shortly before the outbreak of the
Korean War was reported to be in Peking by Chinese
newspapers in Hong Kong. . . . Derevyanko, Mao,
Molotov, and a well known Japanese communist are
reported arguing about using Russian submarines and
transport airplanes for an invasion of Taiwan.
Mao agreed to delay, but was displeased at his
predicament . 2 3
'North Koreans Cross Kum River Push Drive on
American Flank; U.S. to Speed Atlantic Rearming," New
York Times, 15 July 1950, p. 1.
23Radio Taipei (Voice of Free China), August 27,
1950 (Hong Kong dateline). No confirmation of Molotov's
trip has been found. He might have been a logical emis-
sary. He had Communist prestige and was out of work at
the time. (His title of Vice Premier was largely honor-
ary; he had been replaced as Foreign Minister after the
failure of the Berlin Blockade.) Dallin, p. 9. Agense
Grance Presae correspondent Pierre Brisard dismissed the
report about Molotov as "a fiction of Nationalist propa-
ganda from Taipei," but felt that high-level conferences
were being conducted between the Soviets , the Chinese
Communists and the North Koreans. Whiting, p. 187.
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On the last day of September, the United States
Far East daily intelligence summary reported an alleged
high-level conference in Peking on August 14th, at which
it had been decided to provide 250,000 Chinese troops
24for service in Korea. A U.S. Department of Defense
release of December 15, 1954 stated:
In August 1950 ... a Kremlin directive providing
for this Chinese Communist intervention was trans-
mitted to Peiping from Moscow by Lieutenant General
Kuzma Derevyanko. On 14 August the Chinese Commu-
nist Party Central Committee approved the Kremlin
action. 2 5
The point that is being stressed here is that
China was reluctantly drawn into a conflict by the USSR
when she gave every indication of viewing a prolonged
24 Roy E. Appleman , South to the Naktong 3 North
to the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), p. 758.
25..Whiting, p. 187. Yuri A. Rastvorov,
ex-Lieutenant Colonel, MVD , who defected to the United
States in 1954 reported a conversation with Colonel
Pyotr Shibaev in March 19 51. Colonel Shibaev had been
in the Soviet Embassy in Peking during August 19 50 and
said that it took a lot of argument to convince Mao
Tse-tung that Communist China had an interest in the
Korean War. "He said it was not a problem for the
Chinese. But Comrade Stalin continued to press him.
. . . the two of them were firing stiffer and stiffer
messages back and forth between Peking and Moscow.
Finally, after long argument they reached an agreement,
but only after Stalin promised China all kinds of aid."
Yuri A. Rastvorov, "Red Fraud and Intrigue in the Far
East," Life Magazine , 6 December 1954, p. 178.
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war with distaste, always measuring the necessity for
2 6
any involvement against the long-range benefits.
A complete understanding of the motives of the
Chinese leaders may never be attainable. However, it
seems that the Soviets exerted a strong pressure on the
PRC to become involved in a conflict in order to prevent
complete defeat of the Soviets and the Korean Commu-
nists. Initially, the conflict was not of primary
interest to the PRC. It caused her to be deterred from
her primary goal of liberating Taiwan without receiving
any tangible gains. This was China's first major deal-
ing with the USSR. It resulted in little or no gain
beyond the fact that from this lesson the Chinese began
to realize the value of autonomous action, a lesson
which would be reinforced during the Taiwan Crisis of
19 58 and which would ultimately bring about the demise
of Soviet hegemony in the Communist world.
? R
Whiting, p. 129. Mao Tse-tung in 1947:
"Avoid battles of attrition, in which the gains are not
sufficient to make up the losses, or in which gains
merely balance losses . . . . " Mao Tse-tung, Turning
Point in China (New York: New Century Publishers, 1948),




Bi-Polarity Becomes Less a Reality
Pressures for autonomy were also beginning to
assert themselves in the U.S. sphere of influence. An
event showing this occurred during the Cuban Crisis of
1962 when President Kennedy sent Dean Acheson to brief
President de Gaulle on the developments of the crisis.
President de Gaulle stopped Acheson in mid-summary and
stated, "May we be clear before you start. Are you
consulting or informing me?" Acheson replied that he
was there to inform rather than to consult. De Gaulle's
reply was both cryptic and prophetic. "I am in favor of
27independent decision," he acknowledged.
As the PRC found she could be pressured into a
conflict against her wishes, so too, in the Western
alliance, France saw herself involved in a crisis with
possible cataclysmic consequences without really having
had her say. The logical result of France's move toward
autonomy was the development of her own nuclear force.
New forces within the global system and the transforma-
tion and distribution of power within the Atlantic
alliance made the preservation of American hegemony
increasingly difficult. France was to have a say in her
o 7
Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia
J. B. Lippincott Co., 1966), p. 96.
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future destiny, as was China. France became a major
critic of American leadership not only in NATO but
wherever French diplomatic influence was significant.
And so bi-polarity was becoming less and less
palatable in both the East and the West. The crack in
the bi-polar world was growing larger. Rumania became
a semi-independent actor within the Warsaw Pact; the
economic power and influence of both Japan and the
European Community began to rise and along with this
rise in power there occurred a more independent approach
within the international scene; small countries that had
been aligned with the United States had come to realize
that the bi-polar world was no longer a feasible or
acceptable solution to world problems. Even such
trusted and old friends as the Philippines have become
aware of this situation. In a recent interview,
President Marcos replied in answer to the question, "Is
it a fair statement that the Philippines is no longer
so anti-Communist as it once was?"
We believe in peaceful coexistence. The cold war
divided the world into watertight compartments--
those sympathetic to Communism and those who iden-
tified with the free world. Bipolarization has now
not only become unfashionable , but there is a new
flexibility in the policies of those supporting the
conflicting ideologies, Communism and democracy.
We feel it unhealthy for a country to deal only
with part of the world when it poses as a modern and

18
progressive country. We have, therefore, modified
and changed our orientation: We cannot close our
eyes to the 800 million people of mainland China
nor the 200 million people of Russia. 28
At the same time that bi-polarity was becoming
less of a reality, both the super-powers were for a
variety of different reasons experiencing increasing
domestic tensions which limited their ability to pursue
their own conception of world order.
By 1969 the Sino-Soviet confrontation had
reached the point of threatening nuclear involvement
over the Ussurri River incidents
,
which were apparently
only patched over by a hastily drawn up eleventh-hour
.
29
agreement between Kosygin and Chou En-lai. Subsequent
talks have been relatively unproductive as each side has
become increasingly unwilling to compromise.
As China became increasingly powerful the Sino-
Soviet split became increasingly evident. China reached
the position where she could act more independently as
well as pose a greater threat to the USSR. As the
degree in which the Sino-Soviet split increased, the PRC
2 8
"Interview with Ferdinand E. Marcos, President
of the Philippines," U.S. News & World Reports 5 August
1974, p. 38.
DTai-sung An, The Sino-Soviet Territorial
Dispute (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), p. 107.
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found herself confronted with the major problems of
isolation. Isolated to some degree on one side by the
Soviets and on the other by the presence and influence
of the Americans throughout the Asian sphere , she needed
to be accorded the status of a major power to realize
her goals of greatness. Although China suffered domes-
tic difficulties throughout the period of the 1960s,
with the advent of the 70s, the internal problems which
had prevented her from exploiting her position of
autonomy had been rectified and she was now ready to
move as an independent actor on the international stage.
Therefore, President Nixon's 19 72 China visit, which
had such a dramatic effect on Japan and other Asian
countries, resulted from the belated recognition of the
forces at work in the international scene and the
tendency of statesmen to be always one decade behind in
their view of the present. The Nixon Doctrine was
merely the recognition of what had been taking place in
the international arena between the USSR and the PRC.
In order to see just how far the world has come
from being bi-polar in nature, it is important to look
at some of what was believed to be the essential charac-
teristics of the bi-polar world. Kenneth Waltz, writing
in 1964, judged it to have four characteristics. First,

20
that super-power competition knew no geographical
boundaries, where one power became involved so did the
other. Second, that the range of factors included in
the competition broadened as its intensity increased
—
even the smallest losses of territory were inadmissible
on either side; economic and social gains or losses
were a subject of concern to the other and the grist of
major propaganda initiatives. Third, even minor crises
had to be settled at super-power level. And fourth,
that by reason of the preponderant power of these two
states, the system could absorb major political,
30
economic, or technological changes. This, I believe,
is an excellent analysis of the characteristics of that
short period of true bi-polarity of the late 1940s and
early 1950s.
However, as these approaches were carried into
the 60s, the super-powers found that they were no longer
successful. The use of direct economic and military aid
which was designed to gain influence and control in the
underdeveloped countries was no longer effective. By
1969 it became clear to the USSR and to the U.S. that
allegence could not be purchased and that their attempts
30 Buchan, p. 23.
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to impose developmental strategies on the poor nations
without their full acceptance were doomed to failure.
Therefore, a new approach was needed by each of
these nations— an approach which would benefit from the
lessons of the past. China and the United States
recognized this when President Nixon's trip opened up
new opportunities for dialogue between the United States
and the PRC. Moscow and Washington also recognized the
situation with the President's visit in May 19 72 and
June 19 74 and with the signing of the SALT I agreement
which helped to codify the process of negotiation
between those two countries. The Nixon trips also
suggested to the United States that it might be possible
for her to have better relations with both the USSR and
the PRC than either could have with the other. It is
these relationships and the gains and losses resulting
from them which I shall examine in the next chapters.

CHAPTER II
GAINS FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
The border incidents of 1968 and 1969 unques-
tionably caused the most profound soul searching in
Peking. At the time real fear of a Soviet nuclear
attack apparently existed in Chinese elite circles. All
earlier matters dividing the PRC and the USSR now merged
into one overwhelming concern, that of national secu-
rity. Men like Mao and Chou must have sworn that never
again would China face the Soviet Union weak in every
sense, and hence vulnerable whether in a bargaining
situation or in conflict.
The key to a new policy for the PRC was the U.S.
Reapprochement with the United States would provide the
means for China to enter into the international scene
and break out of her isolation. The Chinese sometimes
described China's encirclement in a rather picturesque
way. They claimed that China was surrounded by an
"un-holy alliance" consisting of the "American imperi-
alists, the Soviet social imperialists, the Japanese
military revanchists , and the Indian reactionaries."
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign

23
China's first move to break out of her isolation was to
gain recognition in the UN.
Representation at the United Nations earlier
had been seen in Peking as desirable for one reason
only, to discredit the Nationalists. Although this was
no doubt still in the minds of Chinese leaders , there
later developed some indications that they saw other
values for themselves in a seat on the Security Council.
For example , a seat would give them a more effective
voice in world affairs, especially when they could no
longer count on the Soviet Union to speak for them.
The success of such a bid would depend on recognition
of the government in Peking instead of that in Taiwan
by enough members to make the issue turn on credentials,
not on admission as a new member. A Security Council
seat would be an important step forward for Peking.
Additionally, the move would make the UN more represen-
tative of the world community, although it would not
necessarily make that community more harmonious or the
world organization more effective.
China's rapprochement with the United States did
not guarantee the admission of the PRC to the United
Affairs, United States-Republic of China Relations
,
Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs , 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, p. 15.
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Nations. However, the traditional U.S. stand against
the admission of the PRC seemed to be weakening. Some
of the delegates to the UN felt that at best the
attempts by the U.S. to keep the PRC from being seated
were half-hearted, especially since, at the very
moment of the vote, President Nixon's Foreign Policy
Advisor, Henry Kissinger, was in Peking, a sign which
was read by these delegates as a signal of tacit
2 . .
approval of UN admission for the PRC. Additionally,
there was little evidence that the U.S. could have
prevented China's seating even had she tried.
Whether the United States ' effort to keep the
PRC delegation from being seated was a best effort is
thus subject to some question. Although the U.S. voted
in the negative, when the votes were tallied on
October 25, 1971 the Nationalists were expelled and the
Albanian Resolution which called for only one China was
accepted. The vote on the resolution was 76 for, 35
3
against, and 17 abstaining, which was in excess of the
2Max Frankel, "End of China's Isolation," New
York Times, 26 October 1971, p. 1.
3Winberg Chai , The New Polities of Communist
China (Pacific Palisades, Ca. : Goodyear, 1972), p. 165
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two-thirds majority required for an "important ques-
tion." 4
Following rapprochement of the PRC and the
United States, American allies who had delayed similar
actions primarily out of a desire to avoid antagonizing
Washington soon began to normalize relations with China.
It is symbolic of recent developments that presidents
,
prime ministers , and emperors , representing a wide
political spectrum now visit Peking in a steady stream.
The leaders of the United States and Western Europe
have made the pilgrimage, as have those of Iran, Greece,
and Ethiopia, to mention but a few—taking their places
in the guest rolls beside such "old friends" as the
Albanians, North Koreans, and North Vietnamese. Nor are
the visits confined to political leaders. Americans,
Europeans, and Japanese from various circles, together
with their counterparts from the Third World, come in
great numbers as guests of the PRC. Peking has become
an international crossroads, with only the Soviets and
their closest supporters currently unwelcome. The
4 The U.S. had previously succeeded in barring
the PRC's entry by introducing a resolution to make the
issue an "important question" requiring a two-thirds
majority in the Assembly.
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mystique of Chinese authority and power is correspond-
5ingly enhanced.
That is not to say that the PRC is a super-
power. In many ways, she is at best a medium-power.
In terms of economics, China's GNP of perhaps $100
billion is roughly the same as that of Italy, to which
must be added the footnote that a substantial part of
China's production derives from subsistence farming
which creates no surpluses. Thus in spite—and to some
extent because—of her overgrown population, China's
production places her no higher than seventh among the
nations of the world.
In military terms , although the PRC is now a
significant nuclear power, she is curiously musclebound
in her region. She has missiles but as yet is not
capable of inter-continental delivery and it is hardly
possible that she could employ her nuclear weapons
without triggering a response from one or the other of
the super-powers. Therefore, the military usefulness
7
of her nuclear arsenal is not all that it might seem.
Robert A. Scalapino , "China and the Balance of
Power," Foreign Affairs, January 19 74, p. 350.
6
George W. Ball, "The Super-powers in Asia,"
Adelphi Papers 91 (November 1972): 4.
7
Thomas H. Moorer, "General Purpose Forces
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To be sure, it no doubt contributes to China's security
and state of mind by its presumed deterrent value, yet
its utility as an instrument for offensive use or for
blackmail purposes is severely limited.
When one concentrates on the political future of
a particular geographical region, in this case, Asia,
the distinction between a regional medium-power and a
super-power largely disappears. The point being that
decisions made in Peking may in fact in the long run
have a greater impact on Asian politics than anything
decided in Moscow or Washington. In order to realize
these policies, however, China had to reduce her isola-
tion and vulnerability and explore new opportunities
for manuverability and flexibility. This she was able
to do by her rapprochement with the United States after
she became isolated as a result of the Sino-Soviet
split.
There was undoubtedly debate and uncertainty
concerning rapprochement in the PRC. One factor which
I am sure was considered by the Chinese leadership was
the advanced age of their leaders. The great Chinese
Revolution is still being led by its first generation
Compared," Commanders Digest, 18 April 19 74. An excel-
lent run-down of the military strength of the U.S., the
USSR, and the PRC, both conventional and nuclear.
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leadership and those leaders are all extremely elderly.
It is difficult to exactly determine the current pecking
order in Peking, but the decision-makers clearly include
Mao, who is as of 1975, in his 81st year; Premier Chou
,
who is 74; Yeh Chien-ying, who apparently heads the
military establishment and who is 77; and 69 year-old
Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien. The charmed circle, it is
true, also includes three younger persons—Madame Mao
(Chiang Ching) , now in her late fifties, and the two
Shangai leaders, Chang Chun-chiao, now in his late
gfifties, and Yao Wen-yuah , in his mid-forties.
Another consideration concerning rapprochement
was this : The Chinese leaders no doubt felt it was a
serious blunder on their part to conduct policy toward
the two leading world powers themselves at odds with
one another, and both with powerful forces close to the
PRC in such a way as to antagonize both at the same
time. Apparently, realizing the error of this policy,
and with less to fear from the United States than from
the USSR, Chinese leaders decided to relax anti-
Americanism and to initiate this policy before they
departed the scene.
Mark Gayn , "Who After Mao," Foreign Affairs,
January 1973, p. 304
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Furthermore, it was important for China to break
out of her isolation and somehow enter into nuclear
dialogue with the United States. As China develops a
deterrent capability she will acquire a lever to force
the two super-powers to widen participation in nuclear
arms control talks, and to accept China's participation.
By joining in such talks, the PRC will have effectively
broken the nuclear duopoly of the two super-powers
,
prevented the collusion she so much abhors (the two
super-powers dividing the world into their own spheres
of influence) and gained an opportunity to negotiate a
different distribution of power across the globe.
This is not to say that the PRC has broken into
the nuclear dialogue. However, she has established a
line of communications with the United States and
inevitably the question of nuclear armaments will be
raised in her dialogue with the United States. To some
extent China's position in the nuclear club is reminis-
cent of the Soviet Union's at the time when the U.S.
still held an atomic monopoly. This situation is very
well summed up by Soedjatmoko, in an article entitled
"China's External Policies: Scope and Limitation."
The Soviet Union . . . resorted to building up a
worldwide movement in order to reduce the likelihood
of a pre-emptive attack, to increase substantially
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the political cost of a pre-emptive attack, even to
take the strategic initiative, and abandoned it when
the American monopoly was broken. China's
rapprochement with the United States, her interest
in developing relations with Western Europe, and
with Eastern Europe as well, have to do with her
deep-seated fear of a Soviet attack, and with her
desire to reduce the Soviet threat and pressure on
her. This policy is likely to continue, even when
talks on nuclear arms control, including China will
have reduced any immediate threat to China's secu-
rity. Secondly, China is bound to continue broaden-
ing her relations with other countries to develop
a global basis of support which will reduce the
likelihood of any attack on China.
^
China will seek to meet the soviet threat in
the years ahead by relentlessly pursuing two primary
objectives: (1) a defense in depth against the USSR as
the potential enemy, and (2) a major political counter-
attack on all fronts to neutralize Soviet containment
efforts. On the military front, China will continue
her quest for a creditable nuclear deterrent. One key
item, an intermediate range interballistic missile
capable of reaching Moscow and other parts of Asia has
already been developed. On the political front,
Chinese actions are directed at undermining Soviet
credibility with friend and foe alike, and cultivating
any nation bearing a relationship to Soviet power
g Soed]atmoko, "China's External Policies: Scope




especially those on the Soviet periphery and those
within the Soviet sphere of influence. Lastly, China
will fight vigorously for the support of the revolu-
tionary world, competing with the USSR in order to
represent an alternative socialistic ideology and to
influence the underdeveloped and developing Third World.
During the hearings before a House Committee on
Foreign Affairs in May 1972, Robert A. Scalapino was
asked how the United States fits into this new China
policy. He replied:
At present, . . . Peking is determined to thwart
Soviet containment policies by resistance rather
than accommodations , to enter into dialogue with the
United States, thereby increasing its flexibility
while at the same time weakening the non-Communist
alliance structure in Asia; and to contain Japan




I think the Chinese presently feel that the best
method [of doing these things] is by ending their
isolation and moving into a world scene; having a
forum through the United Nations ; opening up rela-
tionships with a number of countries , including some
with which they have little in common, ideologically
or politically. In this manner, Peking can get out
of the position in which they found themselves in
1968 and 1969. 12
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, The New China Policy: Its Impact on the United
States and Asia, Hearings before a subcommittee of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs , 92d Cong., 2d sess. ,
1972, p. 135.
12 T , .,Ibid.
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Another advantage that accrues to the PRC as a
result of the Sino-Soviet split is that, given her
state of internal development, it is extremely helpful,
possibly even indispensable, to have a foreign enemy
—
both to induce the sacrifices demanded of the Chinese
people in this spartan era and to preserve the unity so
important in an initial nation-building stage. More-
over, to foreign nations, the Soviet threat explains,
even sanctions, China's unrelenting drive to become a
major military power, one armed with a full array of
nuclear weapons— so that this drive doesn't arouse the
fear and hostility it otherwise might. For all of these
purposes, the USSR now occupies the position of prime
adversary earlier occupied by the United States.
This is not to suggest that the PRC and the U.S.
are moving towards a Sino-American alliance. The rela-
tionship will probably stop well short of that. How-
ever, it is equally important that one should not
minimize recent developments. The movement away from
isolation and near-total hostility in the mutual rela-
tions of China and the U.S. has been both dramatic and
healthy. For the present, moreover, the United States
and the PRC share several very broad objectives. Both
desire a military-political equilibrium in the
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Pacific-Asian region that will prevent any single power
from dominating the area—because each currently lacks
either the will or the capacity to play that role her-
self. Hence, both states are committed at this point
13
to balance-of-power politics.
The Sino-Soviet split and China's rapprochement
with the U.S. become more significant when looked at in
the light of specific PRC foreign policy goals. These
seem to include (1) maintenance of the security and
integrity of the PRC, (2) efforts to seize Taiwan, (3)
the unification under the Peking regime of outlying or
alienated territories that the leadership considers to
be rightfully integral parts of the PRC, (4) the outward
adjustment of China's boundaries in the Himalayas and
elsewhere, (5) the protection and enhancement of Chinese
power and influence, especially in adjoining regions of
Asia, and also in competition with the USSR, and (6) the
development of "bargain-basement" methods of influencing
Asian, African, and even Latin American countries by
economic and technical assistance and by advice on
guerrilla warfare and political and economic policy.
The Sino-Soviet split and the current Sino-American




goals listed above with the exception of number
- 14four.
In summary then, because of the Sino-Soviet
split, the PRC realized that she was hemmed in on both
sides—to the east by the U.S. and to the west by the
USSR. She realized that she could not exercise her
influence nor reach her destiny as a major world power
while in this position. She therefore determined to
break out of this confinement. The key to that goal
was improved relations with the United States and
admission to the United Nations. The PRC, by her
admission to the United Nations and her possible recog-
nition by the United States has reaped several advan-
tages: the dam of containment and isolation has been
broken; she has been recognized as the legitimate
government of China; progress has been made towards a
settlement of the Taiwan issue; she is no longer
threatened by both super-powers at the same time; her
relations with Japan have improved; and her prospects
of economic trade in the international area appear
unlimited.
14 Robert C. North, The Foreign Relations of
China (Belmont, Ca. : Dickenson, 1969), p. 74.

CHAPTER III
GAINS FOR THE UNITED STATES
To understand the path of foreign policy which
the United States is following one must constantly keep
in mind the goals of the Nixon Doctrine. The world
situation at the time the Nixon administration came to
power can best be characterized as one of change. The
American public was showing considerable concern over
such international issues as the Vietnam War and foreign
aid programs. Many foreign countries were not in agree-
ment with United States policies and had shown a reluc-
tance to fully support the U.S. on the international
scene. President Nixon was faced with the reality of
coming to power at a time when the mood of the American
people made retrenchment abroad mandatory. In essence,
his problem was to carry out a policy of retrenchment
with as little erosion of American influence on the
international scene as possible.
An indication of the direction of President
Nixon's foreign policy is illustrated by the tone of his
first inaugural address
:
Over the past twenty years , since I first came to
this capital as a freshman congressman, I have
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visited most of the nations of the world. I have
come to know the leaders of the world, and the
great forces, the hatred, the fears that divide the
world. I know that peace does not come through
wishing for it--that there is no substitute for
days and even years of patient and prolonged
diplomacy. *-
With building a durable peace as the goal, the
foreign policy of the Nixon Administration was guided by
three basic principles: partnership, strength, and a
2 • ...
willingness to negotiate. The Nixon Doctrine maintains
that peace is obtainable only through partnership
because other nations now have the ability, therefore
the responsibility, to deal with local disputes which
might have once required U.S. intervention. Conse-
quently, where the success of the U.S. in bringing
about peace and stability once depended upon a policy
of imparted democracy and prosperity butressed by
American military strength in support of a network of
American-led alliances, stability and peace will depend
not on the frequency of U.S. involvement but on the
strength of her alliances and the ability of her allies
U.S., President, Richard M. Nixon, First
Inaugural Address, January 6, 1968.
2 U.S., President, United States Foreign Policy
for the 1970s: Building for Peace s A Report by Presi-
dent Richard Nixon to the Congress 3 February 25 y 1971




to defend themselves. Partnership, therefore, is the
foremost element of the Nixon Doctrine. The thesis is
that the United States will participate in the defense
and development of allies and friends , but America
cannot and will not conceive all the plans , design all
the programs , execute all the decisions , and undertake
all the defense of free nations of the world.
The second element of the Nixon Doctrine is
U.S. strength. The strength of her defense must be
based on precise and crucial judgments. She must spend
no more than necessary, but she must not fall behind an
irreducible minimum of essential military security.
The final principle of the doctrine is negotia-
tion. The U.S. commitment to peace must be convincingly
demonstrated by her willingness to negotiate her points
of difference in a fair and business-like manner with
all countries, both those aligned with her and those
with whom she has been antagonistic in the past. That
there are enduring ideological differences between
nations which bring about difficulty in moderating ten-
sions which arise from clashes of those differences no
one can dispute. But all nations must define their
interests with special concern for the interests of
others. If some nations define their security in a

38
manner which means insecurity for other nations , then
peace is threatened and the security of all is
diminished.
The incorporation of the Nixon Doctrine into a
policy toward the PRC and the USSR would probably be
stated as follows : The primal motive is to seek
normalization of relationships between the United States
and China. Accordingly, the U.S. has established high
level diplomatic talks and initiated cultural and trade
exchanges as a step towards normalization. However,
the U.S. has indicated to China that normalization can-
not take place at the expense of old friends and prior
commitments ; nor will she take sides in any Sino-Soviet
dispute
.
Regarding the USSR, the American spirit of
detente will continue as demonstrated by Nixon's visits
to the USSR in 1972 and 1974, and the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT). Therefore, the goal of the
U.S. appears to be the improvement of her relations
with both powers. More realistically, it appears a
major advantage for the U.S. lies in attempting to main-
tain a middle of the road position vis-a-vis the PRC
and USSR thereby enhancing her position when negotiating
with either party. In this manner, the U.S. can achieve
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her objectives while minimizing her losses and maxi-
mizing her gains.
The concept of splitting the PRC and the USSR
(or in this case, maintaining the split) is not new.
The idea of accentuating Communist Bloc differences
appears to be an old one within the U.S. In 1950, U.S.
leadership was on the fence as to exactly how this
should be done, or if it should be done. Prime Minister
Attlee , speaking for the British Government, favored
wooing China away from the Soviet Union. President
Truman recalled a conversation with Mr. Attlee in
December of that year.
In his opinion, the Chinese Communists were poten-
tially ripe for "Titoism. " He could not consider
that China was completely in the hands of Russia,
and therefore the aim ought to be to divide the
Russians and the Chinese--who are natural rivals in
the Far East. He said, "... all of us should try
to keep the Chinese from thinking that Russia is
their only friend. I want the Chinese to part
company with Russia. I want them to become a
counter-poise to Russia in the Far East. If we
don't accept this theory, if we just treat the




This same philosophy was demonstrated in May
1959 by Senator Hubert Humphrey when he questioned the
wisdom of the U.S. Far East policy.
3Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , 2 vols. (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday S Co., 19 56), 2:402.
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It seems to me our policies are forcing these people
[China and the Soviet Union] to adhere even more
rigorously to each other. I don't have any specific
answer, but I am dubious as to whether we are pro-
moting the ends which you and I both think we ought
to promote.^
During the 1960s, as the split between the USSR
and the PRC became more evident and the PRC became
increasingly powerful, the Soviets began to fear the
5PRC's militarism and were apprehensive of Chinese
assumption of leadership in the Third World and the PRC
found herself increasingly confronted with the major
problem of isolation. This situation within the commu-
nist world had dissolved the unity of International
Communism and had particularly affected the situation
of the PRC. In President Nixon's words:
In the last 2 years , the nature of the Communist
challenge has been transformed. The Stalinist bloc
has fragmented into competing centers of doctrine
and power. One of the deepest conflicts in the
world today is between Communist China and the
Soviet Union. The most prevalent Communist threats
now are not massive military invasions , but a more
subtle mix of military, psychological and political
4U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State
Robertson 3 Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Relations
, 86th Cong., 1st sess. , 1959, p. 65. Senator
Humphrey (D-Minnesota) questioning Assistant Secretary
of State Robertson.
5 China's military strength, primarily her land
army, was growing and she was apparently willing to use
it along the Sino-Soviet border.
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pressure. These developments complicate the pat-
terns of diplomacy, presenting both new problems and
new prospects .... 6
His statement also included a strong disclaimer
of any U.S. wish to sharpen the conflict or to encourage
it. Any accusation that the United States would be
interested in collusion with one of these powers against
the other was described as absurd, and at the same time
the President rejected any attempt by either of the two
powers to interfere with the policy of the U.S. regard-
ing the other.
However, even though this disclaimer has been
articulated by President Nixon, as we have seen from
recent Watergate developments, what is being said is
not always representative of what is actually happening.
This disclaimer of not using the Sino-Soviet split is
even more questionable when taken in the context of
President Nixon's anti- Communist record. Hans J.
Morgenthau commented:
It is noteworthy . . . that an American President
who has consistently built his political career on
uncompromising anti-communism at home and abroad
traveled to the capitals of the two major Communist
powers to replace confrontation with negotiation
.
U.S., President, United States Foreign Policy
for the 1970s, p. 2
7Hans J. Morgenthau, "Superpower Politics After
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The point being made here is not a moral one.
Rather it is simply that by taking advantage of the
Sino-Soviet split certain gains would accrue to the
Nixon administration in both foreign and domestic
policy. This can be more easily explained and under-
stood when one examines the intricacies of both the
international and domestic scenes
.
Nixon apparently had used the Sino-Soviet split
to his advantage during the Vietnam War. He explained
during a briefing of several senators in March 1972 that
as soon as the U.S. involvement in Vietnam lessened, the
United States forces on Taiwan could be reduced and the
reduction would serve as an impetus to Peking to exert
pressure on Hanoi for a Vietnam settlement and a return
• 8
of prisoners. Furthermore, during the same period, the
U.S. was putting pressure on the USSR (then suffering an
expensive wheat shortage) to aid in a settlement of the
Vietnam War. Soviet eagerness to acquire Western tech-
nology, particularly American technology, apparently
helped induce the Soviets to a significant




"What it Means to the U.S.," U.S. News & World
Report, 13 March 1972, p. 19.
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behind-the-scenes role in encouraging the North
Vietnamese to reach a settlement of the war.
The administration further argued that with
normalization of relations with the PRC , U.S. forces in
Asia could be withdrawn, allowing more dollars to be
spent on critical domestic social issues. Few serious
students of domestic affairs would argue that any
genuine progress could be made towards solutions of
massive domestic problems facing the United States with-
out a substantial increase in the allocation of public
funds in those areas. Realities dictated that new funds
for domestic purposes would have to come through a
re-allocation of federal expenditures , in this case
,
funds which would have been spent on the U.S. involve-
ment in Asia and the Pacific. Probably the essence of
the domestic attitude relative to foreign involvement
was summed up by a statement by Henry Kissinger:
Perhaps most important to the United States
, our
undisputed strategic predominance was declining
just at the time when there was rising domestic
resistance to military programs and impatience for
redistribution of resources from national defense
to social demands. 10
9 .William R. Kintner and Richard B. Foster, eds
National Strategy in a Decade of Change (Lexington,
Mass.: Heath, 1973), p. 208.
Henry Kissinger, "The Administration's View-
point," Current
, July/August 1972, p. 51.
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Furthermore, the normalization of relations
with the PRC and detente with the Soviet Union would
help the President's policy in congress. There had
developed in Congress enough dissatisfaction in foreign
policy to effectively curb the administrations efforts.
This mood of Congress can be expressed in the words of
Senator Fulbright written a few years earlier:
It is not merely desirable, but essential that the
competitive instincts of nations be brought under
control. . . . America as the most powerful nation,
is the only nation equipped to lead the world in an
effort to change the nature of its politics
.
1 -1-
A final factor in the domestic politics of these
actions was that President Nixon, as leader of the
Republican Party, even at that time, had lost prestige
for both himself and the Party due to unwise or unpopu-
lar decisions. However, he could greatly enhance both
his and the Party's position by bringing the war in
Southeast Asia to a satisfactory and, by restoring some
kind of economic stability and prosperity, and by
bringing about some measure of international ability to
the troubled areas of the world. If Nixon was success-
ful in these areas , there could be no question that the
Democratic Party would have been dealt a severe setback.
J. W. Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New
York: Random House , 1966), p. 256.
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Nixon's timing on the China visit announcement fit too
well with the presidential election to be purely acci-
dental. It is interesting to note that Senator Robert
Dole, chairman of the Republican National Committee,
predicted the Nixon visit to China would get him many-
more votes in the Eastern United States in the forth-
12
coming 1972 election. It was hoped that a new China
policy might strengthen the Congressional and popular
support of the Administration and aid in establishing
a more healthy political scene at home. This is not to
say that the new approach could be characterized as a
cure-all, but perhaps the flexibility and realism it
displayed would overlap into other areas.
These then were the domestic issues which
appeared to be shaping Nixon's policies towards the PRC
and the Soviet Union during the period under considera-
tion.
On the international scene certain developments
were taking place which made these overtures towards
Moscow and Peking at this time particularly desirable.
As initiated by the Nixon Administration and highlighted
by the President's trip to Peking during February 21-2 8,
12
"Washington Whispers," U.S. News & World
Report, 8 February 1972, p. 8.
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1972, the Sino-American detente had the effect of
dampening considerably the incentives for continued
communist-non-communist confrontation in Asia. The
detente is converting the old rationale for hostility
into drives for negotiations, reduced tension and,
hopefully, over the long-run, cooperation. The Sino-
American detente has allowed China to be brought more
directly into the Peking-Washington-Moscow triangular
relations and has created additional leverage upon the
Soviet Union.
An important aspect to be considered in the
Peking-Washington-Moscow triangular relationship is that
generally speaking the U.S. may fare better in a multi-
polar world because her leaders are the products of a
political system in which, at every step of their
political ascent, they have had to deal with autonomous
domestic political forces as these compete in the
electoral arena. In the final analysis
,
the United
States, accustomed to pluralism at home, can live with
pluralism in international affairs far more comfortably
than can the USSR or the PRC. This is not to exaggerate
the advantage. Both the Soviets and the Chinese are
becoming students of international relations in a
pluralistic world. However, the point is that the U.S.
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will probably have a slight advantage initially. In
the words of Edwin 0. Reischauer in hearings before a
subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in
May 19 72
:
It has always been to our advantage to have broad
and roughly equal relations with the two great
Communist nations. Such a dual relationship
enhances our bargaining position with both. I sug-
gest that it was the desire to increase our leverage
in dealing with Moscow that loomed largest in the
President's mind in moving toward a detente with
Peking.
^
This big-three rapprochement helped towards a
settlement in Vietnam because the leaders of Peking,
Moscow, and Washington perceived the conflict there as
an element in the global confrontation rather than as
an isolated event in the Southeast Asian peninsula. In
both the Middle East and the Far East, President Nixon
bargained for short-term advantages to be paid for in
the long-range currencies of great-power rapprochement.
For this reason, neither the blockade of North Vietnam
nor the intensified bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi (1972)
were seriously contested by either Peking or Moscow.
13 •U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, The New China Policy
,
p. 11.
14 .Kmtner and Foster, p. 216.

48
In keeping with the policy of not taking sides
in any Sino-Soviet dispute , but seeking to improve
relations with both sides, the United States has entered
into a joint venture with Japan and the Soviet Union to
develop Siberian natural resources (gas). Although
Sino-Japanese relations have improved since President
Nixon's trip and leadership in East Asia appears to be
shifting to the PRC and Japan, United States-Japanese-
Soviet cooperation in Siberia is certain to cause alarm
in the PRC. Action of this type re-opens the danger to
Manchuria which is China's bastion of industrial
1 R
endeavor.
In evaluating the potential impact of East-West
trade on these triangular relationships , a distinction
must be made between essentially short-term trade and
any advantages which may accrue to the United States and
the long-term implications of greater economic exchange.
In the short-term, diplomatic gains can be made by link-
ing trade to other issues. Therefore, strategic consid-
erations suggest that the U.S. and its Western allies
could coordinate some aspects of their trade with the
"U.S., Japan Work on Siberian Pipeline Plan,"
Los Angeles Times, 30 October 1972, p. A-16.
Eric Mettler, "Towards Asiatic Leadership,"
Swiss Review of World Affairs, November 1972, p. 2.
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USSR and the PRC in order to realize possible short-
term gains. In the longer-term, however, it is doubtful
whether increased trade will play more than a peripheral
role in resolving any of the basic conflicts between
the United States and the Soviet Union , or between the
United States and China. In the past Soviet interest in
trade has been a function of Moscow's overall policy
line and not a determinant of it. More recently, the
PRC has shown the same indications relative to her
rapprochement with the United States . One should always
keep this basic tenet in mind when dealing with the
Chinese and the Soviets.
Therefore, a kind of divide and influence policy
towards a new balance-of-power in Asia appears to be the
best approach for the United States at this particular
point in time. It was used to advantage during the
Nixon visit to China and in formulating the United
States-Japan-Soviet Union natural resource development
program in Siberia. These two events have also brought
about improved Sino-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese rela-
tions which tend to keep the wedge firmly entrenched in
the Sino-Soviet split. This move also brings out other
implications because the three nations have a historic
distrust of each other.
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The maintenance of the Sino-Soviet split enables
the U.S. to reduce her overseas forces in Asia while
still retaining a presence in her spheres of influence.
This reduction in forces has a tendency to initiate a
stronger desire on the part of Japan to once again
militarize herself to ensure that her overseas interests
are protected and her commercial lines of communication
remain open. Japanese rearmament is desired neither by
China nor the Soviet Union since they both have had
rather unpleasant experiences with Japanese military
might. However, remilitarization on the part of Japan
could have far reaching advantages for the United
States. First it could enable the United States to
further help ensure that the settlement of Taiwan was a
peaceful settlement. Perhaps most beneficial, due to
the degree of Japanese economical interest throughout
South Asia and Southeast Asia which dictates that Japan
take the same position as the United States on the ques-
tion of territorial waters in the Straits of Malacca,
Japanese sea power would inevitably be dedicated to the
maintenance of these sea lanes.
Although the rearmament of Japan is generally
opposed by China, it could introduce a force with a
vital sphere of interest to counter Soviet naval
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expansion in the Indian Ocean. This particular aspect
would be beneficial to both China and the United States.
For the PRC, it would put a semi-friendly force in the
Indian sphere where there is constant strain over border
problems. For the U.S., it would put a friendly force
in the Indian Ocean at a time when it is not always
possible, because of limited units, to keep a force on
station in that area.
While Eastern Europe, from a political point of
view, stands on the sidelines over the Asian question,
her interests and day-to-day relationships are closely
related to the Sino-Soviet split. With the relatively
high tension along the Sino-Soviet border, the last
thing the Soviets want is conflict and hostility on
their western border. The two-front-war is not strate-
gically sound. Therefore, as long as the Sino-Soviet
split continues, European nations can expect a more
conciliatory attitude from the Soviet Union. This then
is another benefit of the split for the U.S. in her
role as a member of NATO. Although tensions remain
high, it is unlikely because of her growing worries in





In summary, U.S. opportunities lie in the direc-
tion of keeping the Sino-Soviet split perpetuated. The
split is the key to the success of some U.S. foreign
policy goals. It provides the opportunity for the
United States to conduct a retrenchment in her overseas
commitments , reduce her overseas forces
,
and to quiet
her domestic turmoil. It appears that the best approach
to achieve the goals of the Nixon Doctrine is a policy
of playing off one major actor against another while
remaining in a relatively neutral position. This
"divide and influence" method of maintaining a balance-
of-power can enable the United States to achieve her





GAINS FOR THE SOVIET UNION
When one examines the gains resulting from the
Sino-Soviet split, it becomes obvious that the U.S.,
the USSR, and the PRC have not received equal gains.
The Soviet Union probably gains least from the new
multi-polar situation which appears to be developing in
the world today. However, the significant point is not
that the Soviet Union gains least but that the officials
of the Soviet Union have reached the sophistication in
world affairs where they no longer feel they have to
control or influence every small nation on the globe
and that they can see gains in a situation of this type.
The Soviet Union emerged from World War II
militarily stronger than she had entered it. She soon
realized, as did the United States, that she could not
shape or control every situation. Because of this
realization, the situation of the 1960s, particularly
the Sino-Soviet conflict, was exceedingly important to
the USSR. When one assesses the present great-power
relationships, one fact relative to international con-
flict emerges : Wars between Europe and the United
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States, between the United States and Japan, or between
Japan and Europe, are too implausible for the respective
military balances between these pairs to have any impor-
tant effects on disputes likely to arise among them.
Even between the United States (or Europe) and the
Soviet Union (or the PRC). Japan and the Soviet Union,
or Japan and the PRC, the rapid escalation of any
particular dispute to the war-threat level would be
rarely if ever warranted, given the costs and risks of
this pattern of interaction and the availability (in
the system we have postulated) of nonmilitary means of
exerting pressure. The only pair for which the military
equation may yet be immediately relevant is China and
the Soviet Union given the unbroken nature of their
border dispute. This fact, I am sure, is not lost on
the Soviet Union. Threfore , not wanting to be threat-
ened simultaneously from both the East and the West,
she is striving to normalize relations with the United
States and is attempting to do this by seeking Soviet-
American detente.
The Sino-Soviet split has had a profound effect
on the Soviet Bloc as a whole, especially in Eastern
Seyom Brown, "The Changing Essence of Power,"
Foreign Affairs , January 197 3, p. 2 92.
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Europe. Because of it, the Soviets have become increas-
ingly more possessive, and the Socialist Camp is
increasingly defiant in terms of the interest of the
Soviet State rather than the world-wide ideological
and/or political movement. Karl Birnbaum summed up the
East European position within the Soviet Sphere of
influence in an article which appeared in the Adelphi
Papers in March 1970.
What has changed is the bargaining power of the
individual East European governments vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union and in some cases the extent to which
the Soviet leadership can manipulate the political
process in certain East European states . Without
going into details, I would argue that the bargain-
ing power available to the East European governments
has been primarily related to the Sino-Soviet con-
flict and the economic relations with the West.
The former could be exploited by them most effec-
tively as long as there was some hope of accommoda-
tion between Peking and Moscow. The recent
exerbation of the conflict has limited the margin
of maneuver, although it has not prevented Rumania
from continuing to demonstrate her middle position
between the two Communist world powers. There are
some indications that the Soviet Union is trying to
extend the validity of the Warsaw Treaty Organiza-
tion to include a possible conflict in the Far
East. 2
The Soviet Union's difficulties with China
obliged the USSR to modify her actions both within and
outside her own sphere of influence. As she began to
o
Karl Birnbaum, "The Future of the Soviet and
American International Systems," Adelphi Papers 66
(March 1970) : 26.
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pursue a sort of appeasement in the West and because of
this policy of Soviet-American detente, the Soviet Union
began to realize certain significant gains which include
certain pertinent agreements which stabilized the Soviet
Union's "western front" at a time of acute fears about
China's intentions in the East, formed a tacit under-
standing with Mr. Nixon's administration which reduces
the risk of emergence of an anti-Soviet Washington-
Peking axis , and gave access to Western technology--
worth billions of dollars—which will help modernize the
3Soviet Union's backward industrial system.
The Soviets are also realizing other long sought
after goals because of detente. NATO has been weakened
because detente makes "cold war alliances" seem unneces-
sary. Detente has also slowed the American defense
effort and lessened the U.S. presence in Europe. Addi-
tionally, it appears that financial and technical trade
with the West will facilitate the Soviet military
build-up.
3
"Beyond the Summit: The Real Test for
Detente," U.S. News & World Report, 8 July 1974, p. 14.
"Advantages of Detente to USSR," Navy Times,
17 June 1974, p. 14.
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Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet split and continued
hostile attitude of the PRC have given the Soviets
further latitude and bargaining leverage in the Strate-
gic Arms Limitation Talks with the United States. The
Soviets have argued that the unpredictable behavior of
the PRC and the size of her population have considerably
complicated the nuclear balance. They have stated that
the problem lies with the balance which the two super-
powers want to maintain and are obliged to keep in their
mutual relationships. It is this balance which can be
destroyed by one atomic strike from China which is com-
plicating the SALT proceedings and especially worrying
the USSR. The Soviets have therefore argued that they
need more than just parity with the U.S. What is
5 ...One of the most recent incidents troubling
Sino-Soviet relations is the duel over the Chinese cap-
ture of a Soviet helicopter which strayed across the
border into Sinkiang in March 1974. The Soviets claim
that the helicopter was on a medical rescue mission when
it lost its bearings. The Chinese insist that the
chopper carried arms and reconnaissance equipment and
was involved in espionage activities. Moscow is worried
about reports that China will give the captured Soviet
crewmen a public show trial and sentence them to long
prison terms as spies. "Pointing the Lance," Time
,
24 June 1974, p. 46.
c
Pierre Mailard, "The Effect of China on Soviet-
American Relations," Adelphi Papers 66 (March 1970): 49;
and Johan Jorgen Hoist, "Parity, Superiority or Suffi-
ciency? Some Remarks on the Nature and Future of the
Soviet American Strategic Relationship," Adelphi Papers
65 (February 1970): 25-39.
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needed, they argue, are additional weapons to overcome
a possible Chinese first strike.
The question, however, is to what degree the
Chinese military effort really does effect the military
balance of the super-powers. As far as nuclear arma-
ments are concerned, the reasoning to be applied has to
be different from that which is applied for conventional
armaments. It is inconceivable that in the near future
the PRC will attempt a nuclear surprise attack against
either the USSR or the U.S. But the real danger and
the condition which the Soviet Union is using to her
advantage in the SALT proceedings is this : From the
moment when China is capable of inflicting substantial
damage on either of the super-powers and more so if she
can inflict unacceptable damage, the PRC is in the posi-
tion where she has destroyed the balance-of-terror
existing between the U.S. and the USSR. Exactly what
type of nuclear arsenal China possesses is unknown
beyond the fact that she does possess one. Even though
no one would attempt to argue for a moment that the
Soviets are pleased with the fact of Chinese nuclear
power, the Soviet Union has found a way of using this
power for additional leverage in the SALT negotiations.
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Furthermore, it has been suggested that the
Sino-Soviet split was the catalyst which brought about
the emphasis on Soviet naval power. Thus her emphasis
on naval power can be seen as the reflection of Soviet
intention to free herself from exclusive dependence on
her huge land forces limited in effectiveness to areas
within which efficient lines of logistics and communica-
tions can be easily maintained, and to acquire a mili-
tary arm which can thrust anywhere in the world,
. . 7including South Asia and the Pacific.
Additionally, the Sino-Soviet split has somewhat
enhanced the Soviet position in Asia. At the present
time the USSR has been making friendly approaches to
Japan. Some Japanese see a relationship between the
USSR and Japan as mutually beneficial. Some Japanese
political strategists are attracted by the potential of
improved Soviet relations as a counter-balance to the
PRC, a warning to Washington, and a hedge against the
loss of American support.
The Sino-Soviet split has taught the Soviet
Union a lesson in international politics and relations
which she will apparently not soon forget. That lesson,







which the Kremlin has learned through long experiences
,
is simply that gratitude is no more a reliable cohesive
among Communist nations than it has been among Capital-
ist nations. The Sino-Soviet split helped to reinforce
that view of the world which is not only pragmatic but
which appears to be an accurate assessment. Therefore,
Soviet foreign policy, because of her difficulties with
China, has in fact become very pragmatic. It is neither
pro-Communist nor anti-Capitalist. Because of her set-
backs, the USSR appears to be taking a look at the
areas of the world and setting a policy for each one.
The important consideration for the Soviets appears to
be what will be advantageous for the Soviet Union. This
seems to be a realistic foreign policy--one not bound
by ideological considerations.
Soviet-American detente also has been and is
being used to the Soviets' advantage in their relations
with the PRC. By her friendly relations with the United
States, the Soviet Union is sending the PRC a signal
that the Soviet-American relationship has primacy over
any other.
The gains for the USSR have not been in the
area of foreign policy alone. The increase in arms
costs has been worrying the Soviet Union. The effects
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of the skyrocketing costs of arms on the domestic
economy include delayed projects
,
planned factories
remaining unbuilt, and less consumer goods. If the
arms race with the U.S. had not been somewhat controlled
the Kremlin would have had to increase the portion of
her budget going to defense, already between 2 and 2 5
percent of the GNP. The trade-off for detente appears
to be increased consumer goods , more and better housing
for the Soviet citizens , and increased civilian
qtechnology.
As did the United States, the Soviet Union
apparently felt that it would lose control with the
development of a multi-polar balance-of-power world.
But as the new balance-of-power began to develop, the
USSR began to realize that from this new multi-polarity
she could receive certain gains and advantages. Multi-
polarity and the subsequent lessening of tensions with
the West have helped to relieve the strains and stresses
on the Soviet economy which therefore has allowed for
domestic change thus relieving the pressures for those
changes. The USSR is reexamining to some degree what
course it must follow under these evolving conditions of
g






multi-polarity. Current Soviet needs of trade, tech-
nology, and credits are served by pursuing a policy of
detente with the United States and wider relations with
the Non-Communist world. Lower tension serves both her
European purposes and her Chinese problem. Therefore,
as have the other major actors , the Soviet Union has
been able to solve domestic problems and make foreign
policy adjustments which probably would not have been
possible had not the Sino-Soviet split taken place and
a new multi-polarity began to develop.

PART II
LOSSES FOR THE U.S., THE PRC, AND THE USSR
RESULTING FROM THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

CHAPTER V
LOSSES TO CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION
China and the Soviet Union have suffered both
immediate and long-term losses as a result of the Sino-
Soviet split. The immediate losses, particularly to
China, are well known. The technological assistance and
advisors which the Soviet Union withdrew from China in
1960 were sorely missed by China during the early
1960s. 1 The immediate effects of the split on the USSR
were probably less pronounced but at the very least the
split brought about the beginning of the end of a mono-
lithic communistic ideology controlled and manipulated
from the USSR.
The long-term losses of the Sino-Soviet split
are those advantages which would have accrued to China
and the Soviet Union were some form of Sino-Soviet
alliance in existence today. This section will attempt
to assess those lost advantages and to relate them to
For an excellent analysis of China's economic
situation in the early 1960s refer to Albert Ravenholt,
"Red China's Sagging Industry," and "The Human Price of
China's Disastrous Food Shortage," American Universities
Field Staff Reports Service , East Asia Series , 10 (Arts.
4 and 5, 196 2).
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the aims of the governments of the two countries. This
endeavor is most certainly visionary but it is an
attempt not so much to predict but to identify those
factors of power which were lost as a result of the
Sino-Soviet split. Additionally, it will look at the
losses incurred in the Soviet Union's attempt at an
Asian collective security system which does not seem to
work without China. Last it will note the costs
involved with foreign aid to developing nations as a
result of the Sino-Soviet split. Admittedly, this paper
is limited in its scope. Several important determinants
are left out of this inquiry. For example, the effect
of such an alliance on present and future foreign policy
is not mentioned. Neither will this paper examine the
sociological and psychological aspects which would be
involved in such an alliance and which are exceedingly
important determinants in themselves. Nor does it
analyze what the balance-of-power would be if China and
the Soviet Union were allied. This section simply asks
the question, How powerful would a Sino-Soviet alliance
be?
There seems to be little doubt that such an
alliance would be extremely powerful. Just how powerful
such an alliance would have been determines the cost of
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the Sino-Soviet split to China and the USSR. In order
to estimate that cost it is first necessary to determine
what factors make an alliance powerful; by what factors
can one say "this alliance is powerful" or "that alli-
ance is not powerful"? If we define power as the
ability of an alliance to enforce its will upon others
,
the question then becomes, What makes this possible?
What factors enable an alliance to hold sway over world
politics?
An advantageous geographical situation is the
first factor of a powerful alliance. Are the allied
countries located near each other? If so, do they share
a long, common border? Are the countries involved well
protected by natural boundaries? Are there resources
for exploitation and are the populations of the coun-
tries vigorous and energetic?
The second factor of a powerful alliance is the
resource base of the nations concerned. Are industrial
raw materials and water power available? If these are
abundant, does the alliance contain the capital, labor,
and technology needed to develop them?
The third factor is the human element. Other
things being equal, great population size is a source of
power--labor , military personnel and a broad
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agricultural base. But population must be related to a
standard of living. If the population is greater than
the land can support and capital must be diverted to it
at the expense of industrial expansion , a large popula-
tion becomes a liability. The factors of loyalty and
morale also complicate the picture, particularly since
these qualities are difficult to diagnose.
The fourth factor is the level of industrial
production which has been achieved by the members of the
alliance. This is dependent upon the resource base and
the availability of supplies of capital, labor, and
technology.
A fifth factor is that of agricultural produc-
tion. The allied countries must be able to feed them-
selves or one should be able to correct the agricultural
deficiencies of the other on a trade basis. For
example, industrial exports could be traded for agricul-
tural imports.
Sixth and last is the factor of military
strength. Although it seems the most obvious element
of power, it does not exist by itself but is almost
totally dependent upon all of the other previously men-






Together the Soviet Union and China cover
approximately 12 million square miles and more than
2 percent of the land area of the world. China has a
total area of approximately 3.7 million square miles,
or about 6 1/2 percent of the world's area. She is thus
slightly smaller than Canada, somewhat larger than the
United States (3 million square miles) and approximately
2
equal to all of Europe. The USSR has an area of about
3 . .8.5 million square miles. There is room within the
boundaries of the USSR for all of the U.S. including
Alaska, plus all of Canada and Mexico. The USSR is so
vast that it crosses eleven times zones
, has a border
which is equal to one and a half times the length of the
equator, and is washed by twelve seas and three oceans.
The Sino-Soviet border is the longest commonly
shared border in the world. The border line arbitrarily
cuts across central and northeast Asia. The topography
2 Donald P. Whitaker et al. , Area Handbook for
the People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 19 72), p. 11.
q
George B. Cressey, Soviet Potentials (Syracuse,
N.Y. : Syracuse University Press, 1962), p. 2.
14
Novosti Press Agency, The Sov%et Umon: Every-
man's Reference Book (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency




ranges from the lofty Himalayan Mountains to the deserts
of the Tarim Basin and the Dzungarian Basin which link
Western China and Soviet-Central Asia through the famous
Dzungarian Gate, a traditionally strategic pass which is
actually a ten-mile-long gorge. The fortification of
the Sino-Soviet border is one of the most costly results
of the Sino-Soviet split. On this border on March 2,
1969, there was a brief but bloody battle over one of
5the obscure islands in the Ussuri River. Border
clashes had occurred in the past, but this new incident
was probably as close to war as two nations can come
without actually declaring war. At least the equivalent
of a battalion of troops, with full armor and artillery,
were used. This was verified when the Soviets admitted
that a full colonel had been killed during the con-
flict. 6
Today the status of the Sino-Soviet border can
best be described as an armed international stand-off.
The USSR in the four-year period from 19 70-74 has
increased her forces in the area from 15 to at least 45
divisions, possibily as many as 148--over one-fourth of
5
The Sino-Soviet Dispute , Keesing's Research







her 16 9 division army. The USSR also has more than one
thousand military aircraft in the area. These conven-
tional forces are supported by a substantial number of
nuclear missiles which can hit targets anywhere in
China. Chinese concentration on defense is equally
intense. In Peking an extensive network of underground
tunnels and air raid shelters has been constructed
twenty-five feet below street level. These have been
shown to foreign visitors as evidence of China's deter-
mination to stand up against the Soviet threat. China
has increased her ground forces on the border from 3 2
divisions to 45 divisions. Additionally, she has been
continually strengthening her air forces and developing
. . 7
at least a first strike nuclear capability.
The costs to maintain and fortify the border
must be staggering for both the USSR and China. The
Soviet Union spends between 20-25 percent of its GNP on
defense and there are rumors that Moscow's spending on
arms production and development has militarized the
Soviet economy and created widespread discontent among
workers reflected in slowdown strikes and demonstra-
tions, and that the Kremlin is becoming more and more
7
"Russia vs. China in Big War?" U.S. News &
World Report, 27 August 1973, p. 33.
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concerned over the continuing economic drain of weapons
ft
spending and its effects on the domestic economy.
The cost to China is equally pressing. The
withdrawal of Soviet assistance in the latter half of
1960 began to confront the Maoist leadership with a
dilemma. The costs of military modernization impinge
primarily on what the Chinese term their "metal process-
ing industry." To the extent that military moderniza-
tion involves research, new designs, experimentation,
new technology, or substantial rearrangement of produc-
tion processes , it impinges on the available supply of
scientists, engineers, skilled technicians and crafts-
men, and critical material in other areas. The more
the military program has as its objective the attainment
of a capability in advanced weapon systems , the greater
the impingement on the higher quality end of the spec-
trum of these resources. The production of investment
goods, upon which economic growth depends, also requires
research and development and metal processing resources.
In China, where there is no excess capacity in these
areas, military modernization competes directly with
economic growth. Resources devoted to military
o
"Arms Costs Worry Kremlin," p. B-6 ; and "Red
China Cires Soviet Arms Cost," Los Angeles Times,
22 December 1974, p. A-10.
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equipment production represent losses in economic
growth; resources devoted to investment goods represent
qlosses in the area of military modernization.
An additional loss of the Sino-Soviet split to
the Soviet Union has been access to the Pacific. The
USSR has the longest Pacific coastline of any country
bordering that ocean. However, frozen seas bar access
for most of the year. The Soviet Union's climate and
topography make it difficult for her to become a Pacific
power in her own right. Even the rivers flow in the
wrong direction. The Volga ends in the isolated
Caspian, and the Ob, Yenisei, and Lena point to the
Arctic Ocean. The Amur bends north before joining the
Pacific. The Don and the Dnieper enter the Black Sea,
but it too is enclosed. Nowhere does the country border
on open ice-free ocean except at Nurmansk in the extreme
northwest. Unfortunately, the Soviet Pacific coast is
not only the longest, but also the most useless. For
9 ...U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, An
Economic Profile of Mainland China , 2 vols. (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), vol. 1: The
Mineral Resource Base of Communist China , by K. P. Wang,
Joint Committee Print, p. 164.
George B. Cressey, The Basis of Soviet





China, by way of contrast, the case is much different.
Along the China coast there are no less than two dozen
modern seaports . It is obvious because of the recent
increase in Soviet naval forces that the USSR desires
to become a naval power. To that end it is more than
likely that the USSR desires to strengthen her position
along the Pacific. However, this will remain the Soviet
Union's back door because of severe geographic restric-
tions and the Sino-Soviet split.
Added to the monetary losses to China and the
USSR resulting from a need to fortify the Sino-Soviet
border is the loss by China of an ally who possesses a
large and powerful fleet and by the Soviet Union of year
round access to the Pacific ports.
Natural Resources
It is difficult to evaluate natural resources
as they relate to any type of alliance because natural
resources are more an individual indication of wealth
than a collective indicator. However, this analysis is
attempted in terms of what one country has that the
other doesn't have and how one could help to make up the





The USSR and China together have vast coal
resources. The USSR has the second largest coal
reserves in the world, with estimates ranging from 1.6
trillion tons to 8.6 trillion tons. China is the
third leading world producer of coal , ranking behind
only the U.S. and the USSR in overall production. Its
coal output is approximately 500 million metric tons
1 o
annually. In short, between the two countries, they
have enough coal for several hundred years of energy
consumption at present usage rates.
Oil
The increasing importance of oil in modern
societies is common knowledge. Both China and the USSR
have sufficient oil reserves and oil production to be
oil exporters. In 1973 China made the transition from
oil importer to oil exporter. China is not the Far
East's Saudi Arabia, but with proven reserves in the








eventually to become China's principal foreign exchange
13
earner.
The USSR possesses vast amounts of oil and
natural gas reserves. Oil production in the Soviet
Union has increased rapidly in the past several years.
In 1967 the country produced 2 88 million tons of oil
(one-seventh the world output). At the end of 1970 oil
i uproduction in the USSR had reached 350 million tons.
In recent years huge deposits of oil and gas have been
discovered in Western Siberia which will probably be
1 5larger than all other known oil and gas deposits.
As oil exporters , China and the USSR will be
able to benefit politically in today's world in which
oil is playing such a gigantic role in international
politics. Allied in an economic Sino-Soviet OPEC they
could exert great power and influence in Asia and
throughout the world.
Iron
Both China and the USSR have huge iron ore
deposits. However, China's present technology makes
only a small percentage of that ore workable. The USSR
13





14- 15Novosti Press Agency, p. 77. Ibid., p. 78.
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has the technology and industrial capacity to develop
these ores. Iron production in the Urals of the USSR
goes back to the days of Peter the Great. Even at that
time, iron shipments were made to England. Some type
of Sino-Soviet alliance would clearly benefit China in
this area.
Other minerals
Modern industry calls for copper, lead, zinc,
aluminum, a long list of alloys, and a growing array of
accessory metals. The USSR and China have a good supply
of most of these. What is important for our purposes is
that deficiencies in reserves of a natural resource in
one country could be made up by the other if there were
a Sino-Soviet alliance. For example, the USSR doesn't
have excessive reserves of tungsten or antimony. Tung-
sten which is an alloy for hardening steel and thus
vitally important is present in China in the largest
reserves in the world. Antimony is also a material used
in steel production. China has been an exporter of
antimony since the late 19 30s. However, China is defi-
cient in nitrogen, phosphorus, and potash--minerals







Fertilizer is essential to China if she is to be able
to produce enough food to feed her millions of people.
The Soviet Union could make up China's deficits while
China could supply tungsten and antimony to the USSR.
The USSR ranks high in her reserves of platinum,
asbestos, potash, phosphate rock, chromium, and manga-
1
7
nese , and has surplus for export.
The point being made here should by this time
be obvious and it need not be labored further. Either
China or the USSR or both rank in the top twenty in the
possession of almost every natural resource—including
1 o
uranium. Together they possess the raw materials
necessary to develop a powerful alliance.
Indus try
The Sino-Soviet split has cost China dearly in
terms of its industrial and technological development.
The core of China's program for rapid industrialization
was the Soviet commitment to assist China in the build-
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equipment for these plants was valued at $3.3 billion,
or some $11 million on the average for each project.
This flow of equipment and technical assistance had a
vital effect on the quality of China's industrializa-
tion, enabling China to produce such prestige items as
jet aircraft, submarines, large electric-generating
equipment, metal-cutting machine tools, tractors,
trucks, and electronic equipment. Soviet aid to China
had also included extensive training of Chinese scien-
tists and technicians in the nuclear sciences in both
the USSR and China, including the supply of experimental
reactors and other nuclear related technology, designed
to eventually provide a base which could support native
... 19Chinese production of Soviet-designed weapons.
The sudden withdrawal of Soviet support in mid-
1960 was, in the words of Chinese economic planner Po
I-po, like "taking away all the dishes when you have
only eaten half a meal." About 20 percent of the Soviet
aid plants begun under agreements concluded prior to
1958 were incomplete. Most of the 125 Soviet aid plants
contracted for under agreements concluded in August 1958
19 ...U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, An
Economic Profile of Mainland China, 2 vols. (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), vol. 2: "Inter-
national Trade of Communist China, 19 50-6 5," by Robert
L. Price, Joint Committee Print, p. 591.
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and February 19 59 and scheduled for completion by 19 6 7
20
were still in the planning stage. Thus, the Chinese
were still highly dependent on the Soviet Union for new
plants and product designs involving technology not
already furnished or with which the Chinese had little
experience.
China has not recovered from this interruption
to her technological development. Technical manpower
in China, especially high caliber technicians, managers,
and engineers, is still in short supply. Her technology
is particularly deficient in the area of electronics.
Although only a little information is available , it
appears that China lags up to 10 years behind the U.S.
in the production of military electronics. Impressive
progress has been made in nuclear and missile programs,
but these programs only duplicate U.S. successes
achieved years ago. At present China probably cannot
manufacture phased array raders , highly accurate iner-








U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment, "The
Electronics Industry of China," by Philip D. Reichers
,
Joint Committee Print (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1972), pp. 106-107.
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During the current Five-Year Plan, China expects
to increase her production of military electronics to
satisfy the demands of her conventional armed forces
,
nuclear and missile programs, and military aid projects.
Small quantities of equipment incorporating integrated
circuits should be operational by this year, and air-
borne radar, if not in production now, should be in
22 •production by 1976. Despite these gains , China has
not likely mastered the production of advanced military
electronic equipment such as full integrated navigation
and weapons delivery systems for aircraft or computer
controlled radar air defense systems. Therefore, China
will continue to lag significantly behind the USSR and
the U.S. in electronic technology.
In her earlier attempts to achieve rapid indus-
trialization, China depended heavily on Soviet capital,
equipment, technical aid, and industrial materials, a
large part of which the USSR supplied on long term
credit. China has resumed her industrial growth but is
still largely dependent on imports. However, she is now
dealing with the West and Japan where purchases are






There is no question that the Soviet Union has
the capability to again assist China in the area of
industrialization if the two were united in a Sino-
Soviet alliance. Industry constitutes the highest
priority sector of the economy in the USSR. In terms of
Soviet statistical concepts and valuation practices
,
industry's share in the economy's total gross output in
1967 amounted to 64 percent, excluding construction,
which contributed another 10 percent. It ranks second
in size among the industries of the world, surpassed
2 3
only by that of the United States.
Therefore, the Soviet Union is not only capable
of furnishing valuable technical aid to China, but there
is also indication that she would be willing. Recent
articles on China in Soviet newspapers, periodicals, and
journals imply that the progress made in the first 10
years of the PRC (when Soviet assistance played a large
role in Chinese development) was much greater than it
has been in the last 15 years. One of the main themes
which is repeated in the analyses of today's China by
the Soviet press is the desire of Moscow to resume close
Sino-Soviet ties which can only be accomplished on
2 3Eugene K. Keefe et al., Area Handbook for the






Soviet terms, i.e., the removal of Maoists. Several
articles have recalled the "warm experiences" of Soviet
technicians in China. What this seems to imply is
that the USSR is casting itself as the great friend and
benefactor of the Chinese people, that the economic and
social problems should be blamed on Maoists, and that
Moscow wants to be friends again.
An analysis of the industrial strength of China
and the Soviet Union shows additional costs of the Sino-
Soviet split. For China, the loss of technical assis-
tance seems to have been acute and lasting. As we have
seen, she lags ten years behind the U.S. in electronic
technology, an area where it is extremely difficult to
catch up because it is an area where cumulative knowl-
edge has been doubling every five years. It would
appear that China can quickly catch up with the USSR and
the West in the area of industrialization only with the
help of the USSR.
Population- -China
Population is never a static thing. People are
being born and are dying all the time and the factors
which might tend to keep their numbers equal are being
24Edward Neilan, "Soviets Seek to Sink Mao,"




upset by modern technology. China's populace, though
large, has in the past been kept down by the combined
effects of famine, flood, drought, disease, and revolu-
tion. The Communists have made great progress against
all of these ills and there is evidence that the Chinese
death rate is decreasing. In China's case, this is not
necessarily a good thing. Estimates (1971) of the
population of China range from 750 million to 850 mil-
lion; estimates of population growth rate range from
1.5 to 2.5 percent. The U.S. Department of State esti-
mates the current growth rate of the PRC population at
more than 2 percent and estimates the current PRC popu-
lation to be more than 800 million. Males 15-49, 185
million; fit for military service, 105 million; 90 per-
cent of the people live on one-sixth of the land--i.e.,
more than 700 million live on 600,000 square miles, an
average of 1,200 per square mile. Total population per
cultivated square mile: 1,800 (compared with U.S.:
130; India: 700: USSR: 260; Japan: 3,700). Urban
9 ^population is estimated at 15-20 percent. With a
25
U.S. , Department of State, Information for
Travelers to the People's Republic of China , News
Release
,
Bureau of Public Affairs , Office of Media
Service, 6 September 1972, p. 1.
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population of this size, it is not surprising that China
is a poor country.
China's gross nation product of $105 billion
remains far below that of Italy, a country with approxi-
n c
mately 7 percent China's population. The per capita
2 7income is equivalent to approximately US $100.
China's own Premier, Chou En-lai , refers to China as "a
poor, backward state." Generally speaking, life for
the average Chinese is difficult and hard by any stan-
dard. However, when one speaks of standards of living
it is imperative that he remember he is dealing with a
relative quality and that even though life in China may
be difficult today, in the past life in China was often
grim and barely endurable. Prior to the revolution it
was sometimes necessary for Chinese parents to sell
their children into bondage to escape debt , and female
9 Q
children in many cases were left to die. During years
of famine millions of people starved to death. There-
fore, it was not a light boasting when Chou En-lai
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29 ...Oscar Handlin, A Victovval History of Immtgra-
tion (New York: Crown Publishers, 1972), p. 154.
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recently stated that China has "succeeded in insuring
30
the people their basic needs in food and clothing"
an achievement that none of the world's other massive,
overpopulated agricultural nations can quite match. The
benefits as well as the hardships of China's progress
have been distributed with a minimum of inequality. The
average factory worker makes a meager $2 8 a month; the
average peasant living on a commune about half that.
Essentials, like food, medicine, and housing, cost next
to nothing and to the envy of the rest of the world,
have not increased in price m twenty years. Medical
care, in the form of the "barefoot doctor" reaches the
DO
rural areas. * A smaller scale program in urban areas
trains "worker doctors." The result of this approach to
rural and urban health care has been to make some kind
of medical care available to virtually everyone every-
where in China. Therefore, the average person in China
is probably better off than at any other time in
30
"A Victory for Chou," p. 22. 31 Ibid.
32
The word "barefoot" symbolizes the identifica-
tion of paramedical personnel, mostly young men and
women selected from poor peasant families, with the
poor, often shoeless clients in the countryside. The
"barefoot doctors" are taught to recognize and treat
common diseases, perform first aid, practice acupunc-





history, at least to the point where he is fed, and
housing, however drab, and rudimentary medical care are
available to him.
Many Americans have the tendency to look at
morale and loyalty in other countries in terms of their
own life styles. There is a tendency to say, "I would
hate to live under a Communist regime in this or that
country, therefore this or that people must hate it
also." When one analyzes loyalty in the PRC it is
important to consider that the Chinese people have never
been free. They compare the tyranny of a communist
regime only with other tyrannies they have known. The
old Manchu warlords were dictators in their respective
areas, and their rule was harsh or benevolent depending
upon their whim. Despite the purple prose heaped upon
Chiang Kai-shek during World War II, his dictatorship
was from any standpoint worse than that under which the
Chinese people live today. An entry in Bodde ' s diary
of June 10, 1949, reads:
In Shangai a few days ago according to the papers
here, more than 200 corpses of workers, students,
professors, and other citizens were recovered from a
mass grave into which they had been cast shortly
before the taking of Shanghai. They had been exe-
cuted on the orders of the Kuomintang police com-
misioner. 33
Derk Bodde, Pek%ng Diary (New York: Henry
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Gossip and stories of Chiang Kai-shek's moral dearth are
plentiful. One tells of a Kuomintang general who was
shot by a firing squad the day after he interfered with
Chiang's beating of a servant. Another tells that many
Americans can remember recruits for the Nationalist
army during the war, seized from their villages and
marched to the front with iron collars on their necks,
shackled together on a long chain. These stories may or
may not be true. The important thing is that they are
widespread throughout the peasantry and citizenry of
China.
Another essential which most Americans tend to
forget is that the Communist victory in China would not
have been possible without the support or at least the
acquiescence of the majority of the Chinese people. In
addition to the positive achievements of the communist
regime, there are the combined effects of propaganda and
education on the people. The Chinese in today's China
are a vast captured audience. The radio blasts out
government propaganda from trains, buses, store fronts,
wherever a few Chinese are likely to be congregated.
When people are not working they are generally required
Schuman, 1950), p. 193

88
to attend meetings where they listen to political
speeches
.
Another powerful stimulus towards supporting
the regime is the factor of national progress and pride
China is progressing rapidly, and the Chinese people
are impressed with their progress and proud of it.
Therefore, it would seem logical to assume that the
average Chinese, much as the average American, either
actively supports his government or passively acquisces
to it.
Population- -USSR
The latest survey (July 1, 1974) showed the
total population of the Soviet Union to be 2 52 mil-
34lion. The history of that population as relates to
hardship and oppression is probably equal to that of
China. Prior to the Russian revolution, the country
was ruled by the Czar. The government under him was
totally autocratic. The government was the Czar, the
Czar was the State, and he owned society and all the
facilities of life. The Czar ruled as he wished. If
° "Report of USSR Central Statistical Board on
Results of Fulfillment of the State Plan for the Devel-
opment of the National Economy of the USSR in the First
Half of 1974, from Pravda," Reprints from the Soviet
Press
,
15-31 August 1974, p. 29.
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the Czar was extremely powerful or strong willed, then
life became much more difficult. If he was weak, then
generally speaking life didn't improve because those in
authority under him were equally oppressive. Slavery
was abolished in Russia in 1861, however, the style of
life for most peasants and laborers did not change
significantly in that they were not given the means to
improve their lives. After the Revolution, things
improved somewhat, but that improvement was followed all
too quickly by the terrorism of Stalin, his labor camps,
and hundreds of thousands of political executions.
Today life in the Soviet Union, although harder
and more difficult than that of the United States, is
probably much better than it has ever been for the
average Soviet citizen and it appears to be getting
better every year. According to Soviet government
figures , the average monthly cash earnings of industrial
and other workers totaled 139.5 rubles in the first half
of 1974, an increase of 4.8 percent over the first half
of the previous year. Wages
,
plus payments and benefits
out of the public consumption funds, added up to 188
rubles, an increase of 4.6 percent over the previous
year. The wages of collective farmers went up by 6 per-
cent. Payments and benefits received by the population
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out of the public consumption funds increased by 6.5
percent. The public consumption funds guarantee the
population free education and medical care, pensions and
other benefits, student grants, accommodations either
free or at reduced rates at sanatoriums and vacation
homes, the upkeep of nursery schools and day care
centers
,
paid leaves and other types of social and
,. , .35
cultural services.
Additionally, the class structure, even though
it still exists, allows for upward mobility. Khruschev
himself was an example of that upward mobility. There-
fore, the average Soviet citizen would compare with the
average American citizen (as does the average Chinese)
in that he is socialized within the system, carries out
his duties, and perceives himself to be sharing the
values from the system. Generally, he is satisfied
with the system and, equally important, feels that he
is making progress.
Therefore, we can say that the average Soviet
and Chinese citizen is loyal to his government and
actively supports it or at least acquiesces to it.






Sino-Soviet rapprochement would in all probability have
the support of the Chinese and the Soviet people.
Agriculture
As we have seen, population, when it is as large
as China's, is an asset in terms of a ready available
storehouse of manpower for industrial and military needs
but it is a liability in that it must be fed. Although
it is not generally known, China is one of the world's
foremost agricultural nations. Because of wide varia-
tions in climate, topography, and soils, practically
every farm crop and type of livestock can be produced.
China produces more rice, millet, sweet potatoes,
sesame, and rapeseed than any other nation and ranks
second or third in the production of soybeans, tobacco,
wheat, and cotton. China also ranks high in animal
husbandry although livestock are valued more for draft
power and fertilizer than as a source of food. More
hogs are grown in China than in any other country in the
world. China vies with the USSR for second place behind
the U.S. in the value of agricultural commodities pro-
's c
duced. However, China has two basic problems. The
36
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment,
"China: Agricultural Development, 1949-71," by Alva
Lewis Erisman, Joint Committee Print (Washington, D.C,
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first is the fact that only about 11 percent of China's
3 7total area is arable. The second is that China's
agriculture is labor intensive resulting in relatively
low productivity per worker. Although chemical ferti-
lizers are increasingly being used, China's fertilizers
consist primarily of animal manure, human excrement,
and compost. As previously mentioned, the USSR has a
surplus of chemical fertilizers and could be of assis-
tance in this area. The Soviet Union could also assist
in the area of mechanization. Since 1949, China has
been increasing the number of tractors in use. Units
of fifteen horsepower, reported to be 400 in 1949, had
increased to 135,000 in 1965, and to an estimated
150,000 in 1967. However, this was far short of the
1.2 million tractors China estimated she needed for full
mechanization. Prospective improvement in production
has been important in the publicizing of tractors by
the mass media, but as late as 1971 there was little
direct evidence of the results of their use. In any
case, the area under mechanical cultivation was by mid-
3 81971 still small, probably well under 10 percent.




38 Ibid., p. 410.
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Mechanization of agriculture in the USSR,
although at a lower stage of development than in the
U.S., is much further developed than in China.
Obviously, this situation would provide commercial
opportunities in the area of trade to the USSR and
benefits in the form of agricultural development to
China. This is not to say that China is not able to
feed her 800 million people. She has been able to do
this , but China continues to be one drought , or one bad
harvest, away from starvation. And although China has
been successful in her effort to feed her people, that
effort has resulted in the disruption of her biological
science research and her education system. There are
relatively few highly trained scientists and scholars
in China and many of these had to be taken from their
research and educational institutions and put on the
farms in order to increase crop yields. Most of these
scholars are quite elderly and their time would be
better spent training a new generation of capable
39
researchers and teachers. This is another area where
the Sino-Soviet split and the resulting loss of Soviet
advisors has been detrimental to China.
39
"Red China Crops Reported Ample but Science




China's basic agricultural problem then is that
she has too little land and too many people. The only-
way she can increase the yield of that land is through
intense use of commercial fertilizers, mechanization,
and increased education of her farmers—all areas where
the Soviet Union could be of assistance had the Sino-
Soviet split not occurred.
Military
If present trends continue, the United States
runs the risk of losing out to the Soviet Union as the
world's leading military power in the coming decade.
Top Pentagon analysts predict on the basis of current
trends that by 19 80 or a few years thereafter the U.S.
could face the following:
America's land-based missile force would be
vulnerable to a "first strike" knockout by Russia's
greatly expanded force of powerful launchers with
multiple warheads.
NATO, in the face of an all-out Soviet conven-
tional attack, would have the choice of allowing
the Russians to overrun Western Europe in a few days
or of resorting to use of tactical nuclear weapons
in the first hours of war.
American allies in Europe and Asia as well as
neutrals, perceiving U.S. weakness and Soviet
strength, would orient their policies more and more
to favor Moscow rather than Washington . ^0
"American Military Power Sliding into Second




Pentagon analysts base this picture of the
strategic outlook on the following facts
:
1. In the U.S., the defense establishment is
under pressure from all sides. The atmosphere created
by U.S. -Soviet detente and preoccupation with economic
troubles is making the public indifferent to the prob-
lems of military preparedness, a mood reminiscent of
the 1930s.
2. Budget cuts combined with the effects of
inflation have drastically reduced the purchasing power
of the Defense Department.
3. The switch to all-volunteer forces means
that military manpower is barely adequate and extremely
costly. The Ninety-fourth Congress is almost certain
to be hostile to defense spending at a time of economic
crisis .
By contrast, the Soviets, unaffected by public
opinion, are increasing their defense budget every year
and are expanding the size of their forces despite
detente. They are now beginning a massive new missile
build-up with the apparent aim of seizing strategic
superiority over the U.S. Their armies in Eastern
Europe are being beefed up with more men, tanks, and
equipment at a time when NATO strength is dwindling.
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One can assume that this threat is real, allow-
ing for a certain amount of "wolf-calling" by the
Pentagon. To the U.S., the implications of a Sino-
Soviet military alignment are many; to the Soviet Union
and China, the losses in the military area are numerous.
China was allied militarily with the USSR under
a Sino-Soviet mutual assistance treaty signed in
141
February 19 50 — a treaty concluded while the two coun-
tries had a warm relationship and which was to be valid
for thirty years. For all practical purposes, however,
this pact has been inoperative since 1960 because of
ruptured ideological and interparty relations between
the two countries
.
An analysis of the military losses to the USSR
and China can be made by relating the potential power
of a Sino-Soviet alliance to the power of the U.S. The
USSR maintains an impressive active duty force strength
of about four million men, backed up by a trained
reserve force of at least another four million men who
have served with the active forces in the last five
years. There are about 20 million men registered in the
42
ground force reserve alone.
41Whitaker et al., p. 603.
42
Moorer, p. 3. More recent U.S. estimates

97
Large as it is, the active force of the USSR is
not as large as China's active establishment, which has
the strength of over four million men and an armed
14.3
militia of over five million men.
By contrast, the U.S. maintains a much smaller
active force of about two million, supplemented by
about one million individuals in selected reserve units
plus others who are individually available for immediate
mobilization. There are about three million total U.S.
44
reservists, standby, and retired members.
Of course, each of the three countries could,
over time, field a much larger force. These figures
simply display the force levels which would be available
in the initial stages of a major conflict. At the
onset, a Sino-Soviet alliance could field approximately
38 million men, whereas the U.S. could field approxi-
mately five million.
A Sino-Soviet alliance would be equally impres-
sive in terms of naval strength. Secretary of Navy
increase the number of men under arms in the Soviet Army
by as much as a million. L. Edgar Prina, "U.S. Raises
Estimate of Red Army," San Diego Union , 20 October 1974,
p. A-l. Pentagon informants said the new figures were
much more the result of previous underestimates than any
recent growth of USSR troops.
43 44Moorer, p. 3. Ibid., p. 7.
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J. William Middendorf has noted that in fiscal year
1976, the number of active ships in the U.S. fleet will
drop below 500, compared to 926 on June 30, 1969. The
U.S. will have 100 fewer ships on duty in June of 1975
than in 1940, a year before Pearl Harbor. The Soviets,
meanwhile, are continuing to enlarge and modernize their
fleet with technically advanced, sophisticated weaponry
and missile systems. The USSR now has 2,100 combat
vessels, many of which are designed for first-strike
purposes. The Soviet Union continues to spend three
times more than the United States on defense research
and development, while continued economic problems are
45taking a toll on the American fleet.
China's major surface force is still quite
small--less than 100 major surface ships and sub-
marines—but it is growing slowly. The largest ships
in the PRC fleet are the new guided missile destroyers,
the first of which became operational in late 19 71.
Each ship carries Styx-type missiles, anti-aircraft
guns, and antisubmarine weapons. More of these ships
45,,Budget Cuts Deplored, Strong Navy Necessary,"
San Diego Union
,
13 October 1974, p. C-2.
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are expected to be operational soon, and others are
46
under construction, or fitting out.
Although it appears that major surface combat-
ants are not receiving the same priorities in the
Chinese Navy as was evident only a few years ago, in
contrast to the slow progress in the construction of
major combat surface ships, China is rapidly expanding
its guided missile boat force. By mid-1974 China had
over 100 of these small surface combatants. All of
these boats are armed with a Chinese version of the
highly effective Soviet-designed Styx surface-to-surface
missile. This missile boat force significantly enhances
the Chinese Navy's capability to engage in coastal
operations
.
At present China does not have the capability
to project its massive land forces beyond the Eurasian
land mass. However, combining its massive land army
with Soviet sea power would enable a projection to
almost any point on the globe.
The USSR has the largest submarine force in the
48
world, approximately 343 boats. The Soviet submarine







Russian Sea Power (Boston
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force will continue to be the world's largest throughout
the next five years. The total number of submarines,
however, is expected to decline as the older diesel
submarines are phased out faster than the new, more
sophisticated submarines are delivered to the fleet.
China's submarine force, in terms of numbers, is
roughly equal to that of the U. S. --approximately 135.
However, except for a single modern-design long-range
submarine, the Chinese submarine force consists pri-
marily of Soviet-designed, but Chinese-built, medium
range Whiskey and Romeo class submarines. Both of these
Soviet classes were considered to be excellent sub-
marines at one time, but they incorporated features
which now are considered obsolescent by U.S. and USSR
standards. China may have produced a new version of the
Romeo class. If so, series production of this submarine
or possibly even a further-improved version could begin
in the near future.
Chinese naval forces will continue to be much
smaller and much less capable than those of the U.S. and
the USSR. However, if the Chinese navy were to be sup-
plemented by Soviet technicians and advisors plus Soviet
hardware
,





projecting its power beyond the China Sea. If we look
at numbers alone, a combined Sino-Soviet fleet, both
surface and sub-surface, would number about 2,700 units,
whereas the U.S. has a combined total of just over six
hundred surface and sub-surface vessels.
In analyzing tactical airpower, the picture of
a Sino-Soviet alliance is equally formidable. Together
their tactical air force would number approximately
5,500 planes. The U.S. has about 5,000 aircraft. 50 In
almost every area of ground support weapons a Sino-
Soviet alliance would result in numerical superiority.
This includes tanks, armored personnel carries, and
heavy mortars
.
Both the U.S. and the USSR have large nuclear-
capable forces. In terms of missile warheads, the U.S.
is substantially ahead of the Soviet Union--roughly
52
6,922 to 2,337. In this regard, China is still far
behind the U.S. and the USSR, both quantitatively and
qualitatively. While the United States and Soviet Union
theater nuclear weapons inventories number in the
several thousand, the Chinese total nuclear weapons





"American Military Power," p. 31.
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the few hundreds. The Chinese nuclear weapons stockpile
is expected to increase rapidly over the next few years,
as fissionable material production facilities are
expanded.
The U.S. is at least equal to the USSR in over-
all nuclear capability and probably still superior in
nuclear weapon technology. However, that equality is
affected if not overturned when one adds China's sig-
nificant nuclear capability to that of the USSR.
This brief analysis shows that a Sino-Soviet
alliance would represent the most formidable military
alliance the world has ever known. If, as many believe,
nuclear weapons will never be used, that alliance is
even more formidable. Nuclear weapons, in the view of
many, have more a psychological than a practical value
today. The Soviet-American balance-of-terror and more
particularly the ABM treaty, which leaves the popula-
tions of both countries almost wholly unprotected, have
effectively neutralized their missiles except as politi-
cal bargaining ploys. The only usable form of military
power, it is argued, is non-nuclear; the conventional
land, sea, and air forces that great and small nations
alike are prepared to employ are what make national
JJ Moorer, p. 16.
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power credible. If the preceeding argument is realis-
tic, and I believe it is credible, than the Sino-Soviet
split has cost the USSR and China a military alliance
which would be second to none in the world today, and
with it, the political clout which such a force would
give in international affairs.
The losses mentioned above were determined in a
relatively objective manner. The absence of the Sino-
Soviet split and the resultant Sino-Soviet alliance
would have given advantages to China and the USSR, pos-
sibly not to the extent mentioned, but to a significant
degree nonetheless. There are other areas where losses
were incurred which are more subjective. One of these
has been in the Soviet Union's attempt to form an Asian
collective security system.
An Asian Collective Security System
Toward the end of his speech at the World Con-
ference of Communist Parties in Moscow on June 8, 1969,
Soviet Party General Secretary Brezhnev, after mention-
ing the Soviet Union's long-standing proposal for the
convening of a conference on European security, noted
that "we believe the course of events is also placing on

104




There was no elaboration of this statement by
Brezhnev nor by any other official Soviet source at the
time. But his terse statement was enough to trigger in
capitals throughout the world a flood of speculation
about the meaning of this new Soviet departure and the
intentions which were behind it.
There were two possible explanations for this
new course of events. Only a few months prior to the
conference in Moscow the long smoldering Sino-Soviet
conflict had ignited into armed conflict in the Ussuri
River section of their common border. Most observers
believed that the USSR was seeking to organize an anti-
China united front in Asia to encircle or contain the
PRC just as it was beginning to emerge from the trauma
and isolation of the cultural revolution. Others read
into Brezhnev's remarks a wider purpose. The Nixon
Administration had announced its intention to wind down
the war in Vietnam, and the first withdrawal of American
forces had already taken place. A change of America's
54 • •Arnold L. Horelick, The Soviet Union's Asian
Collective Security Proposal : A Club in Search of Mem-
bers (Santa Monica: Rand Corp. [March 1974]), p. 1,
quoting Pravda, 9 June 1969.
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highly visible profile in Asia and a limitation, if not
a reduction, of U.S. commitments was generally antici-
pated. (This was confirmed a month later when President
Nixon introduced the Guam Doctrine.) This, and the
earlier announcement of Britain's intention to withdraw
from East of Suez, led many observers to conclude that
the USSR was preparing to move into the vacuum which the
retraction of Western power would create, or at least,
that Moscow wished to explore Asian receptivity to a
Soviet-sponsored collective security system which would
replace the old Western security managers , forestall a
possible renewal of Japanese imperialism, and prevent
China's expansion before she grew too strong.
The objectives of the Soviet "proposal" caused
much foreign speculation. U.S. policy planners were
cited as believing that
North Vietnam was the keystone of the Soviet strate-
gic design for Southeast Asia, with Moscow hoping
to maintain through Hanoi a foothold which would
counter China's growing power in post-Vietnam
Asia. 55
Yet no Soviet statement in almost five years since the
Asian collective security scheme was first mentioned has
specifically mentioned North Vietnam (or North Korea) as




a potential partner in the system, and the Communist-
ruled Asian states, excepting Outer Mongolia, have not
made any independent comment on the Soviet proposal.
Indeed, while the Asian collective security system was
later represented by Moscow as being Pan-Asian in scope,
explicit invitations to discuss it with the USSR have
been aimed (again, with the exception of Outer Mongolia)
only at non-Communist states.
The USSR's collective security proposal for
Asia was in all probability a gigantic trial balloon
testing the political climate for a Soviet initiative
whose shape, scope, and substance would depend almost
entirely on events and reactions. In any case, China's
reaction to this proposal was immediate and violent.
She denounced it as an imperialist plot to encircle
56China. The USSR countered by stating that an Asian
collective security system would be created to frustrate
Western imperialism, particularly that of the U.S. and
potentially that of Japan, and only vaguely referred to
Maoist hegemonism. But the widely accepted interpreta-
tion of the Soviet proposal as a bid to create an Asian
united front against China, fueled by Peking's own self-




spokesmen to deny such participation. China is opposed
to the Soviet security system whether implicitly
included or excluded from it. China's opposition has
meant that other Commusist-ruled states in Asia, inde-
pendent and neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict, would
also have no part in a Soviet sponsored collective
security system as long as it was seen by Peking as
being directed against China.
So approximately five years after it was first
suggested, the USSR's campaign to seize the diplomatic
initiative in Asian security matters cannot be counted
a success. To be realized, a successful Asian security
structure would require a radical change in the politi-
cal and military environment of Asia. Chinese hostility
virtually guarantees that any proposal to create a
formal security structure of which the USSR is a part
will not be successfully undertaken. Even an invitation
to hold a conference to consider the desirability of
such a structure is unlikely to find a nucleus of
accepting countries. Only a radical improvement in
Sino-Soviet relations (including a settlement of terri-
torial issues on terms acceptable to China and a sub-
stantial reduction and redeployment of Soviet military
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forces along the border) could conceivably cause the
PRC to withdraw its objections to such a proposal.
Soviet and Chinese Foreign Aid
A brief look at the Soviet and Chinese aid pro-
grams to the developing world points to another area
where excessive costs were incurred as a result of the
Sino-Soviet split by both the USSR and China. The
Soviet and Chinese aid efforts are in many ways compli-
mentary although unwilling and unwittingly so and
within limits. In The Soviet Union and Developing
Nations
,
Jan S. Prybyla explains:
Chinese material aid and advice focus on agricul-
ture, geological prospecting, light industry, road
and rail transportation, and public health. The
Soviets specialize in heavy and retractive indus-
tries especially metallurgy, machine tool manufac-
ture, power generation and transmission, oil
extraction and processing, and coal mining. With
few exceptions, Chinese projects tend to be small
or medium-sized (textile mills, tannery plants,
cigarette and match factories , dry docks for
repairing small boats) while the Soviets go in for
large-scale projects . . . . ^7
It is not necessary to force the argument to
show that if the aid China and the USSR give to
developing countries is unwittingly and unwillingly
Jan S. Prybyla, "The Sino-Soviet Split and the
Developing Nations," in The Soviet Union and Developing
Nations, ed . Roger E. Kanet (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1974), p. 278.
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complimentary at present, its attractiveness to the
developing world could only increase if China and the
USSR were cooperating in their aid efforts . Not only
would the aid be more attractive to the developing
world, but it would also represent a real savings to
China and the USSR because redundancies in the aid
system could be eliminated.
In summary, the losses which have been incurred
by the USSR and the PRC as a result of the Sino-Soviet
split appear to be very tangible. The Soviet Union has
found that an Asia security system is not possible
without China. The split precludes a Sino-Soviet
military and trade alliance which would seem beneficial
to both countries . Each has also incurred the costs of
having to fortify a common border of M-,000 miles— costs
which are very real because they represent to China
alternative programs such as industrial and agricultural
development and to the Soviet Union relief from an
already staggering military budget.

CHAPTER VI
LOSSES TO THE UNITED STATES
On October 1, 19 7M-, George Meany, President of
AFL-CIO, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the subject of detente, spelled out feel-
ings shared by many Americans. He characterized detente
in the following manner:
Detente has produced a silly euphoria in the West,
. . . [but] is viewed with cold calculation in the
Soviet Union. While detente has made anti-communism
unfashionable in the West ... in the East, it
means an intensification of the ideological strug-
gle. Here's how the Soviet Union sees detente:
Detente is based on U.S. weakness.
Detente means intensification of ideological
warfare.
Detente means an undermining of NATO.
Detente means ultimate Soviet military superior-
ity over the West.
Detente means recognition by the West of the
Soviet Union's ownership of Eastern Europe.
Detente means withdrawal of American forces
from Europe .
1
Although Meany can hardly be termed a completely
objective witness, his views reflect the concern of many
Americans and U.S. allies in Europe and Asia who believe
that the United States is currently following a course
which produces as many losses as it does gains . For
Ruthven E. Libby , "No Change Expected in Com-
munist Ideology," San Diego Union, 26 January 1975,
p . C-6 .

Ill
example, the President's 1973 report on foreign policy
listed among U.S. goals and achievements the battering
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union
and between the United States and China. Relative to
the Soviet Union, the President explained that the
United States had engaged in negotiations designed to
produce specific agreements both where differences
existed and where cooperation was possible. In this
way, the President explained, the U.S. would be able to
diffuse the threat of nuclear confrontation. He felt
that progress in one area would induce progress in
others. In other words, a situation of gathering momen-
tum would be created. The President referred to his
May 1972 summit meeting in Moscow as a major step in
the direction of a steadier and more constructive rela-
tionship. However, the President's report failed to
discuss the policy considerations involved in reaching
some of these agreements with the Soviet Union and
others with China. It did not explain the impact of
massive Soviet grain purchases on domestic food prices
or indicate whether this factor was considered in reach-
ing the final trade decisions. Nor did the report dis-
cuss the implications of closer commercial and
industrial relations between two economic systems as
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different as those of the United States and the Soviet
Union, relations which if they are to flourish would
require political and economic considerations on both
sides. The report seemed to indicate that it was a
foregone conclusion that a type of interdependence would
develop which would automatically lead to cooperation.
The report seemed to be more an historical over-view
. . . 2
than a meaningful discussion of the realities involved.
Europe
An additional question is what do her Western
European allies think of the U.S. -Soviet detente. Most
assuredly the Europeans share relief at any lifting of
the threat of war. Certainly President Nixon, and more
recently, President Ford, and Chairman Brezhnev have
created the impression of the diminishing likelihood of
3
an armed conflict. However, on the other hand is the
question of what the ending of the cold war means in
terms of Western Europe's future. Detente apparently
carries the promise of change but some European leaders
2
U.S., President, Report to Congress, "U.S.
Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace,"
Federal Register, 3 May 1973, pp. 1-179.
3Edward Neilan, "Real Issues—Solutions Might




seem to wonder what that change will be. There is, for
example, a concern that Europe's security needs may be
overlooked as a result of the U.S. -Soviet detente. To
a large extent these needs previously have been met and
paid for by the United States. Several divisions of
U.S. troops remain stationed in Europe and U.S. nuclear
power serves to off-set that of the Soviet Union. By
contrast, the Western Europeans, with the exception of
West Germany, make minimal expenditures for their com-
mon defense under NATO. Moreover, there are only
limited British and French nuclear capabilities and the
former is derived in part from special arrangements with
the United States. As the Europeans see it, detente not
only increases the likelihood of U.S. force withdrawals
from Europe but also of a U.S. -Soviet nuclear deal which
could have a profound effect on Western Europe's secu-
rity and in which they might not be consulted.
Notwithstanding these fears, the Europeans show
little inclination to take up the slack in Western
defense in the event of a U.S. withdrawal, French
nuclear development excepted. On the contrary, the
European leaders see the rapprochement as raising
popular pressures within their countries for further
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reductions in the already limited European defense
effort. 4
Less openly discussed are European concerns over
the commercial consequences of detente. Total Soviet
trade with non-communist nations is not great. What
there is, however, the Western Europeans have pursued
vigorously for many years; in 19 71, for example, of a
Soviet trade with non-communist nations of $9 billion,
the Western European share was $4.4 billion. By con-
trast, the United States resisted trade with the USSR
for many years . Even now there are substantial barriers
to the development of that trade.
Only recently has American commerce appeared on
the scene, although Western Europe has been hard pressed
to compete with such things as the 1972 wheat deal and
the 1973 natural gas agreements. In short, detente has
cleared the way for a new and powerful competitor for
Eastern European trade and this competition helps feed
the Western European anxieties created by detente.
Additionally, there is the fear that this new U.S.
4
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, European Reaction to the Soviet-United States
Detente
, a report by Senator Mike Mansfield (Washington,






relation with the Soviet Union will coincide with a
period of estrangement from Western Europe. That need
not be the case. However, the possibility of. this
happening seems very real because of the suspicion and
resistance in Western Europe regarding the U.S. -Soviet
detente. Europe seems to be questioning the credibility
of the United States commitments to NATO and the North
Atlantic Treaty, the "bottom line" of which reads that
the U.S. would risk nuclear war over a Western European-
Soviet confrontation. It seems that detente has put the
U.S., at least in some European ways, in the position of
an adversary rather than an ally.
Japan
U.S. -China relations appear to have produced
equally serious questions among U.S. allies in Asia.
George W. Ball, in an article in the New York Times
Magazine
,
points to the Japanese reaction
:
Although a year ago Americans would have thought the
idea preposterous , some strangely prescient Japanese
have long been haunted by the fear that the United
States might sometime arrange a rapprochement with
China without their intermediation or even their
knowledge, leaving them isolated. Last July 15,
they saw that nightmare beginning to come true .
°
c
George W. Ball, "We Are Playing a Dangerous




For years the United States had rested the
security of Europe primarily on NATO. Equally central
to the defense of the Far East has been her alliances
with Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. While China remained
isolated and discussions with the Soviet Union were
concentrated on European affairs there seemed little
reason to involve Japan in those diplomatic dealings to
the extent that the United States had involved her
Western allies. Nonetheless, most Japanese took it for
granted that the United States would fully consult their
government in advance of any super-power talks which
affected Asian power relationships—something the U.S.
did not do. Japan expected to be treated as a full-
fledged ally. She wasn't.
Suspicion and mistrust of U.S. intentions has
resulted in Japan from Nixon's visit to China in
February of 197 2. The Japanese seem to be convinced
that the U.S. has almost certainly reached understand-
ings with the Chinese which could threaten Japanese
interest during the fifteen hours of formal talks
between President Nixon and Chou En-lai and the longer
period Henry Kissinger spent with Chou on his earlier
visits. This lack of communication with Japan has also
created doubts about the durability of the American
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security commitment. U.S. actions may be forcing Japan
to make a separate peace with Peking. Any Peking-Tokyo
agreement would affect the U. S . -Japanese agreement con-
cerning the use of U.S. air bases on Japanese soil.
These arrangements require that Japan must agree to the
aircraft's mission before the air field can be utilized.
Already the Chinese government has made it clear to
Tokyo that no normalization discussions can take place
until Japan recognizes Peking as the sole legal repre-
sentative of the Chinese people, acknowledges that
Taiwan is part of China, and abrogates its peace treaty
7
with the Chinese Nationalist Government.
The U.S. must therefore face the hard reality
that her lack of communication with Japan could produce
a crisis. If the government in Tokyo were to elect to
withhold the cooperation needed to enable U.S. aircraft
to carry out their missions, the entire Far Eastern
defense situation (particularly the defense of Taiwan)
could be compromised.
The possibility of a separate Peking-Tokyo peace
coupled with the increasingly vocal view of some Ameri-
cans that Japan is receiving a "free ride" on the
7 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign





U. S . -Japanese security commitment, could force the
Japanese to rearm— something the U.S. has previously
stated Japan should never do. For several years Japan
has operated upon a principle of "N-2," which means she
keeps her technology up to date so that she could pro-
o
duce an operational nuclear weapon within two years.
The possibility of Japan becoming a nuclear power makes
current U.S. diplomatic conduct particularly dangerous.
It is one thing to envision a nuclear Japan allied
closely to the West. It is altogether something dif-
ferent to have an allienated Japan armed with nuclear
weapons. In short, U.S. actions have confused and
angered Japan and caused her to mistrust U.S. inten-
tions .
Taiwan
The Taiwanese seem to be equally disturbed by
the U.S. policy toward China. Taiwan is an obsession in
the minds of the Chinese. The U.S. seemed to feed that
obsession when the Nixon Administration extended de
facto recognition to Peking through the President's
visit and other steps to broaden Sino-American contacts.






relationship between Taiwan and the mainland is not a
matter for the U.S. to decide." The Nixon-Chou
communique declares that the U.S. government "does not
challenge" the position of "all Chinese on either side
of the Taiwan Strait . . . [that] there is but one China
and that Taiwan is a part of China." Kissinger allowed
a glimpse of that new China policy in December 19 71 when
he said, "The ultimate relationship of Taiwan to the
People's Republic of China should be settled by direct
negotiations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of
China." The President confirmed this position in his
State of the World Message in February 1972.
It is extremely important not to be misled by
these pronouncements. The parties to the negotiations
proposed are a nuclear power of about 800 million in one
corner and an island state of 15 million in the other.
Michael Reisman, in a statement at hearings before the
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs commented on a possible
Taiwanese interpretation of the new U.S. position:
Q .
Foreign Policy Association, "The Smo-Soviet-
American Triangle," Great Decisions 1973 (New York:
Foreign Policy Association, 1973), p. 7.
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, The New China Policy, p. 75.
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. . . the President's magnanimous promise of
neutrality approaches Anatole France's classic
characterization of the "majestic equality of the
law," forbidding the rich as well as the poor to
sleep under bridges , beg in the streets , and steal
bread. . . .
It is impossible to imagine that preliminary
negotiations with China did not include the question
of the Disposition of Taiwan. It is equally hard
to believe that the decisive coincidence of
Kissinger's trip to Peking and the critical UN vote
on the China seat were mere oversights. President
Nixon's "state of the world" innuendo about Taiwan
on February 9, 1972, repeated almost verbatim Dr.
Kissinger's press conference statement 2 months
earlier. The joint communique confirms the suspi-
cion that the United States has agreed to China's
demand for Taiwan ....-'--'-
The new U.S. -China policy has resulted in a
blow to the economy of Taiwan. Over the years the U.S.
has become an increasingly important trading partner of
Taiwan. However, the unseating of the Republic of China
from the United Nations and President Nixon's trip to
Peking and the Nixon-Chou communique have created
uncertainties which have begun to slow U.S. investment
in Taiwan. Additionally, the Japanese government has
suspended the granting of new credits to Taiwan since
the UN vote and Japanese investments have also slowed
12 •greatly. Economically, the status of Taiwan is not









by U.S. investors amounted to approximately $500 mil-
lion 13—10 percent of Taiwan's GNP.
Although the economic status of Taiwan is not
critical to the United States, Taiwan is critical to the
U.S. Far Eastern defense organization. The importance
of Taiwan to the U.S. -Asian defense link should be
obvious. A look at the map demonstrates that America's
first line of defense is the chain of islands and
peninsulas in East Asia running from Singapore to
Japan— the so-called Ess-Jay line. Taiwan is the pivot
point on this line. With Taiwan in the hands of a
potential enemy, the entire Ess-Jay line comes unstuck
and the U.S. is compelled to fall back thousands of
miles in its strategic planning. This theory has been
proven historically. Taiwan was Japan's base of opera-
tion when she launched her offensive against Southeast
Asia during World War II. From Taiwan, she had control
over most of the Pacific and , for a time , isolated
Australia and New Zealand. If the Soviet Pacific fleet
based at Vladivostok is to be contained, then Taiwan







China has stated that there can be no normaliza-
tion of relations between Peking and Washington until
the U.S. defense treaty of 1954 with the Republic of
China is terminated. The United States expresses an
intention to carry out the obligation of that treaty
but at the same time has set upon a course of normaliz-
ing relations with China. It seems that the two courses
are mutually exclusive. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that U.S. allies both in Asia and Europe have
begun to suspect that the U.S. is entertaining the
possibility of adopting new attitudes towards its treaty
commitments
.
The U.S. defense commitment to the government of
the Republic of China is patterned after similar agree-
ments with the Philippines, Japan, and the Republic of
Korea. At present the credibility of those commitments
is also in doubt. The transition from an American cen-
tered East Asia towards a multi-polar Asia has proven
to be a traumatic experience for many of the U.S. allies
and their leaders in Asia. Although no one questions
American military power or, for that matter, the
strength of the American economy, uncertainties do
revolve around the American will to honor her defense
commitments and the impact of that uncertainty on
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foreign policy. There is fear that the United States
is creating an attractive vacuum in Southeast Asia. One
need only recall a period in the late 1940s when the
United States withdrew its armed forces from Korea and
the then Secretary of State and Chief of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff both said that Korea was outside the
defense perimeter of the United States which went from
Japan to the Philippines and so on. Within six months
the North Koreans had launched a massive invasion and
the United States was involved in a long and bitter war
in Korea. This lesson in history makes current fears
understandable
.
The U.S. apparently entertains the notion of
playing in the margins of the Sino-Soviet split, thus
avoiding entanglements which could be dangerous or
costly and at the same time playing both the PRC and the
USSR to her advantage. Because of her present Sino-
Soviet policy, it seems that the United States is the
loser in many areas. The Soviets are suspicious of
American actions. The Chinese are not merely suspicious
but they were convinced as early as 196 3 that the U.S.
policy is directed towards playing the two Communist
"No Meddling in Sino-Soviet Differences by
U.S. Imperialism," Peking Review, July 1963, p. 9.
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powers against one another. Rather than a simple
balance-of-power relationship which the U.S. seems to
be acting on relative to China, the USSR, and the United
States , there is one which is much more complex and
dangerous and which involves U.S. European and Asian
allies. Those allies see the trips to Peking and
Moscow as not likely to be in their best interests.
They also seem to be convinced that whatever is the
visible outcome of these meetings , the unannounced
results which could include possible secret agreements





The basic thesis of this paper is that the Sino-
Soviet split is the catalyst from which Moscow, Washing-
ton, and Peking are able to realize certain foreign
policy gains and opportunities, and that accompaning
these gains are losses, either anticipated or unantici-
pated. A review of these gains and losses will be
useful as we attempt to balance them and to draw con-
clusions .
Gains for the PRC
:
1. Entrance into the international scene as a
member of the UN
2. An end to her isolation
3. The establishment of communication with the
U.S. , especially in reference to nuclear dialogue
4. Establishment of China as a possible leader
of the Third World.
Gains for the U.S.:
1. Retrenchment on the international scene
allowing a reduction of military forces in Asia
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2. A resulting increase in dollars which can
be directed towards domestic problems
3. The enhancement of the U.S. negotiating
position with either party as a result of her middle-of-
the-road approach vis-a-vis Moscow and Peking
U . The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet Nam
which appears to have been assisted by Soviet-American
detente and normalization of relations with China
5. Pluralism in international affairs which
appears to be a more comfortable position for the United
States than it is for either the USSR or the PRC
6. The possibility of Japanese rearmamemt
,
a desirable condition for the U.S. but not for China
or the USSR
Gains for the USSR:
1. A reduction of tension in Europe and a
corresponding reduction in the pressures for an effec-
tive NATO
2. Financial and technical trade with the
West
3. Further latitude and bargaining leverage in




M- . The enhancement of the Soviet position in
Asia in that some Japanese see the Soviets as a counter-
balance to China
5. The redirection of rubles towards domestic
projects as a result of the lessening of tensions in
Western Europe
Losses for the USSR and the PRC:
1. Cost of fortifying and defending a 4, 000
mile common border (these costs can be put in perspec-
tive if one considers the political and military
difficulties which the United States would have if she
were required to fortify and defend the U. S . -Canadian
border)
2. The loss of an exceedingly important trading
partner especially with reference to raw materials
3. The loss of a military alliance which would
in all probability be second to none in almost all areas
of military power
4. The costly redundancies in their aid systems
to developing countries
Losses for the USSR:
1. An ice-free access to the Pacific




Losses for the PRC : The loss of Soviet tech-
nological aid in the areas of military, industrial, and
agricultural development.
Losses for the U.S.:
1. Detente is seen by many Americans as a sign
of U.S. weakness
2. Detente means an undermining of NATO
3. Detente means ultimate USSR military
superiority over the U.S.
4. Detente is seen by some European leaders as
evidence that the United States is no longer prepared
to defend Europe at the risk of war
5. Detente, in the eyes of some Western
European leaders, has put the U.S. in the position of a
new and powerful competitor for Eastern Europe trade
6. Normalization of relations with China has
placed the credibility of U.S. defense commitments to
some of her allies in doubt
The approach which initially seems to apply to
an analysis of gains and losses is that of an accoun-
tant. However, it soon becomes obvious that a mathe-
matical approach to a subject as complex as the
Sino-Soviet split and a multi-polar balance-of-power is
hardly possible. The prime difficulty is that gains
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and losses seem to be fixed in time; a short term gain
can become a long term loss , and a long term gain can
be a loss in the short run. For example, China's new
policy of normalization with the United States and her
subsequent recognition as a world power can be termed an
immediate gain. However, if China should attempt a
rapprochement with the Soviet Union at some later date,
the Sino-American relationship becomes a deficit which
would make it more difficult to affect such a rapproche-
ment. A similar argument can be applied to the oppor-
tunities presented to the U.S. by the Sino-Soviet split.
Normalization of relations with China has allowed the
United States to reduce her military forces in Asia and
thereby save badly needed dollars to be used elsewhere.
However, because of U.S. withdrawals from Asia, Japan
could rearm to a degree not anticipated thereby
threatening U.S. interests in Asia. Such an eventuality
is an example of what appeared to be a gain in the short
run becoming a distinct loss in the long run.
A second difficulty is that a tri-polar inter-
play (if that is what is developing) is exceedingly
more complex than is a bi-polar one and is therefore
The developing multi-polar balance-of-power
could be pentagonal, including Japan and Western Europe,
which would make the situation even more complex.
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more difficult to manipulate. It seems to be advanta-
geous because of its stabilizing effect on world
politics. However, is this really the case? The
developing balance-of-power , be it tri-polar or penta-
gonal, could in reality constitute a potential threat
to whatever stability the world now possesses. Further-
more , the particular features of the psychology of the
PRC and her foreign policy gains derived to date from
her split with the USSR might induce the PRC to take
risks which could be dangerous not only to the USSR but
to the United States and to world peace in general.
Should that happen, it seems clear that there would have
been no gains in the long run.
Chou En-lai made an observation in his report
to the Tenth Party Congress which has application to
current Sino-American relations. In his condemnation of
Moscow he said
:
We should point out that necessary compromises
between revolutionary countries and imperialistic
countries must be distinguished from collusion and
compromise between Soviet revisionism and U.S.
imperialism. Lenin put it well : "There are com-
promises and compromises . "2
Chou apparently thinks the compromises of 1971-72 with
the imperialistic United States were a necessary matter
o
0. Edmund Clubb , "China and the Super-power,"
Current History, September 1974, p. 135.

131
of expediency. There appears to be little thought that
such a compromise represented a permanent commitment.
But, what if those compromises were seen by the United
States as permanent? The resulting miscalculations
could be exceedingly dangerous, even deadly, since they
involve countries which have a nuclear capability. The
Cuban crisis gave us an example of how dangerous a mis-
calculation by a nuclear power can be.
When I began this study I expected to find a
deep concern for gains and losses , either expressed or
implied, in any major foreign policy decision. What I
learned instead is that to say a country's foreign
policy sometimes appears to be unclear is an under-
statement. That foreign policy is an entity in itself
also appears to be incorrect. Foreign policy seems to
be the resultant of domestic pressures, domestic poli-
tics, and international influences which come together
to either shape foreign policy decisions or to be shaped
by them. There appears to be little concern for long
term gains or losses in foreign policy. Rather, foreign
policy seems to reflect only concern for the immediate
goals. One gets the feeling that crisis management is
used as a means of arriving at foreign policy decisions.
Consequently, we can more easily understand such events
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as the Bay of Pigs, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, and the
Japanese shocks of 1971-72. There appears to be a "we
need an answer now, just tell me the good things"
approach towards foreign policy. Accompanying this
approach is the basic precept of foreign policy which
is "a country will do that which appears to be in its
immediate best interest." This helps to explain U.S.
detente with the USSR and normalization of relations
with China in that these particular courses of action
allowed the U.S. to direct attention towards her grow-
ing domestic problems. Normalization of relations with
the U.S. allowed China to break out of her isolation.
Detente with the U.S. was particularly attractive to
the Soviet Union because of her hostile Eastern border.
What can be said of the losses? In most cases,
the losses seem so obvious and so real that the only
conclusion one can reach is that these losses were
probably discounted, dismissed, or ignored. Therefore,
this study reinforces the opinion concerning foreign
policy which has been held by many political scientists
over the years— "a country will do what it perceives to
be in its immediate best interest."
If this analysis of foreign policy is correct
,
can predictions for the future be made? The most
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obvious prediction is that as the new balance-of-power
system develops the U.S., the USSR, and China will
change or continue their policies to reflect their
immediate interests . This statement seems so obvious
it appears to be unnecessary. However, in my opinion,
there are factors which seem to indicate that change
rather than continuation is more likely. The age and
failing health of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung threaten
the stability of the Peking government and therefore
China's future policies. I believe that Chou's moderate
policies towards the West are by no means assured of
continuation after Chou and Mao pass from the scene. In
this same vein, it is well to recall that following her
first acceptance of Soviet aid in 1927, China turned out
the Soviet advisors as soon as her current objectives
had been achieved. Once the goals of Smo-American
normalization as seen by China are met, China's policy
in all probability will change. It is not unreasonable
to assume that should a strategic Sino-Soviet associa-
tion become mutually advantageous, the USSR and China
would again form some type of alliance. I feel that
this alliance will take place simply because the USSR
and China have lost too much as a result of the split
,
3 Cressey, Soviet Potenttals , p. 198.

134
that its continuation is becoming increasingly costly,
and that this rapprochement will take place after the
deaths of Mao and Chou. Additionally, the Soviet Union
has discovered that the Soviet sponsored Asian security
system will not be realized without China's participa-
tion. Therefore, if the Soviet Union desires to play
an increasingly active role in the international poli-
tics of Asia (and apparently she does), she will be
forced to make this accommodation with China.
In regard to the United States, I believe that
the policy of playing in and around the margins of the
Sino-Soviet split cannot be continued indefinitely.
That policy will become too involved and complex and at
some point the U.S. will find herself forced into the
position of having to choose one course or the other.
A more peaceful world is not guaranteed in any event.
As the new balance-of-power system develops , the coun-
tries concerned— the U.S., the USSR, and China, and
possibly Japan and Western Europe--must evolve some
common rules and shared perceptions of the dynamics of
this new multi-polar system, or at least develop an
understanding of the perceptions, interests, and strate-
gies of the other parties. Therefore, it is likely that
the remainder of this decade will be a period of
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considerable tension and conflict as each nation
maneuvers in an attempt to realize any available advan-
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This thesis deals with the new world power
structure which seems to be emerging to modify the old
two-sided balance-of-power system. The key to the
emergence of this new order appears to be the Sino-
Soviet split which can be interpreted as a foundation
for the establishment of a new multi-polar international
system. The Sino-Soviet split and the ramifications of
the accompanied Sino-American and Soviet-American rela-
tions are seen as setting the stage for this future
world organization.
The method used to interpret this possible
future world power system is to examine the foreign
policy gains and losses for the People's Republic of
China, the Soviet Union, and the United States which
result from the Sino-Soviet split. The gains and losses
are analyzed from the standpoint of both domestic and
foreign policy.
The conclusions drawn by this study are (1)
foreign policy gains and losses are extremely difficult
to fix in time, i.e. , a short term gain could very well
be a long term loss; (2) the People's Republic of China
and the Soviet Union will seek a rapprochement but not
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until after the deaths of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai
;
(3) the United States policy of playing in and around
the margins of the Sino-Soviet split can not be con-
tinued indefinitely because that policy is too involved
and complex and at some point in time the United States
will find herself forced into a position of having to
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